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INTRODUCTION

Until very recently, the law of South Carolina and other jurisdictions on liability for defects in a home has been characterized by contrasting approaches in the treatment of sales versus
leases. Where sales are concerned, the courts have imposed an
implied warranty of habitability and of reasonable workmanship
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss3/2
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because of the view that such transactions are for the purchase
of a home rather than for the underlying realty. Thus, paralleling the general developments in the law of sales of chattels
under the Uniform Commercial Code and strict products liability law, courts have abandoned the old doctrine of caveat
emptor and the completed work rule in order to bring the home
buyer within the ambit of a policy of consumer protection. In
contrast, comparable development did not take place with regard to leased premises and the doctrine of caveat lessee generally prevailed. As a result, the parties were left to their own contractual devices to plan for the risk of personal injury or
property damage caused by defective premises. Though recent
developments now grant lessees expanded rights, particularly
under statutes, the common law approach to lessees contrasts
sharply with the treatment of buyers.
This article addresses the contrasting approaches to sellers
and lessors of residences.
I.

A.

SALES OF RESIDENCES

Introduction and Background

Early common law in South Carolina treated sales of chattels very differently from sales of realty. When chattels were involved, the doctrine of caveat venditor ("let the seller beware"),
which is based on the principle that a sound price implies a
sound commodity,1 often was invoked. In contrast, transactions
involving real property traditionally were governed by the doctrine of caveat emptor ("let the buyer beware"),2 and a disappointed buyer's remedies were limited.3 In particular, no implied
warranties existed in the sale of real estate, whether improved or
not. Moreover, under the "merger doctrine," any contractual
warranties or conditions developed in the negotiation for sale
were merged into the deed. Deed provisions governed the parties' liabilities unless one party clearly and convincingly demon1. For a review of early cases, see Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229
S.E.2d 728 (1976).
2. See id.
3. A traditional exposition of the remedies historically available to the disappointed home buyer in South Carolina is given in Frasher v. Cofer, 251 S.C. 112, 160
S.E.2d 560 (1968) (noted in Comment, Real Property, 20 S.C.L. Rav. 864 (1968)).
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strated that no such merger was intended.4 In addition, the common law did not impose tort liability for injury to third parties
occurring after work had been accepted. 5 Thus, absent fraud' or
an expressly reserved warranty, the buyer or other injured person was without recourse against the seller or the builder after
work had been completed and accepted.
South Carolina has rejected these limits on liability in cases
involving the sale of residential buildings. Courts have imposed
liability for negligent injury to foreseeable victims and adopted
the doctrine of caveat venditor.7 This latter development is consistent with a national trend to impose an implied warranty of
habitability in the sale of improved realty for residential purposes on the view that such transactions are for the purchase of
a "home" rather than simply real estate.' This trend parallels
4. For a discussion of the "merger doctrine," see Lane, 267 S.C. at 501-02, 229
S.E.2d at 729-30, and Hughes v. Greenville Country Club, 283 S.C. 448, 322 S.E.2d 827
(Ct. App. 1984).
5. See Clyde v. Sumerel, 233 S.C. 228, 104 S.E.2d 392 (1958) (reviewed in Case
Note, Torts, 12 S.C.L.Q. 604 (1960)).
6. Fraud supersedes the doctrine of caveat emptor. See Pruitt v. Morrow, 288
S.C. 298, 342 S.E.2d 400 (1986); Lawson v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C. 477, 193
S.E.2d 124 (1972); see also Byrn v. Walker, 275 S.C. 83, 267 S.E.2d 601 (1980) (structural
stability of house); Cohen v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972) (termites);
May v. Hopkinson, 289 S.C. 549, 347 S.E.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1986) (termites). Similarly, an
"as is" clause in a contract does not constitute an absolute defense to an action for fraud
and deceit. See MacFarlane v. Manly, 274 S.C. 392, 264 S.E.2d 838 (1980).
7. See infra notes 71-127 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427
(1984); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Redarowicz v.
Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982); Keys v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So.
2d 670 (Miss. 1983); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965);
Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739 (Okla. 1981); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
1968). No case, however, has applied strict liability to any vendor who has not constructed the building or been responsible for both its sale and its construction. Cf. NV.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 104A, at 721 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; Mallor, Extension of the
Warranty of Habitability to Purchasersof Used Homes, 20 Are. L.J. 361 (1982). For law
review discussion, see Toole & Habien, The Warranty of Habitability:A Bill of Rights
for Homebuyers, 44 MONT. L. REV. 159 (1983); Note, Implied Warrantiesin New Homes
and Their Extension to Subsequent Purchasers in Arizona, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J. 113
(1983); Note, Recovery Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability Theory, 10 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 285 (1982); Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability - Changing
Privity Requirements, 47 MONT. L. REV. 127 (1986); Note, Another Look at the Implied
Warranty of Habitability in North Carolina, 64 N.C.L. REV. 869 (1986); Note, Implied
Warrantiesin New Home Sales - Is the Seller Defenseless?, 35 S.C.L. REV. 469 (1984);
Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Residential Property Conveyances, 62
WASH. L. REV. 743 (1987).
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developments in the law of chattel sales under the Uniform
Commercial Code9 and strict products liability law. 10 In all these
areas, courts have abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor in
favor of the doctrine of caveat venditor in order to further a
policy of consumer protection.
B. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Even when caveat emptor applied to sales of residences,
South Carolina sellers of real property were liable for fraud,
which traditionally has been stated in terms of nine elements:
In order to recover in an action for fraud and deceit, based
upon misrepresentation, the following elements must be shown
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence: (1) a representation;
(2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that
the representation be acted upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance of
its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer's

right to rely thereon; (9) the hearer's consequent and proximate injury. Failure to prove any one of the foregoing elements
is fatal to recovery."
The plaintiff's complaint must set forth sufficient facts to show

that each of these nine elements is present.12 One recent case
held that a motion to dismiss should be granted when the "complaint fails to allege all nine essential elements of fraud." 3

9. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-314, -315, -316, -318, -715(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
10. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8,at § 104A; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 402A, 402B (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. In South Carolina, strict products liability has been imposed by statute. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10 to -30 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); see also Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co., 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E.2d 735 (1983);
Hatfield v. Atlas Enters., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900 (1980).
11. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 275 S.C. 381, 384, 271
S.E.2d 414, 415 (1980) (citing O'Shields v. Southern Fountain Mobile Homes, Inc., 262
S.C. 276, 204 S.E.2d 50 (1974)).
12. See Mutual Savings & Loan Ass'n v. McKenzie, 274 S.C. 630, 266 S.E.2d 423
(1980); Bookhart v. Central Elec. Power Co-op., 222 S.C. 289, 72 S.E.2d 576 (1952). The
new South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure have not changed this requirement. See
infra note 13; see also H. LIGHTSEY & J.FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CML PROCEDURE
114 (1985).
13. See Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 294 S.C. 240, 242, 363 S.E.2d
691, 692 (1988) (complaint omitting essential elements of defendant's intent and plaintiffs ignorance is inadequate and subject to motion to dismiss under S.C.R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)).
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Other cases, however, have indicated that the complaint need
not explicitly list the nine elements so long as it sets forth the
basis for an action in fraud. 4 Moreover, the supreme court, on
occasion, has been very liberal in construing conclusory pleadings, 1 5 particularly when the defendant has not moved that an
allegation be made more definite and certain.' 6
The nine elements of fraud are well settled and are repeated
often in South Carolina cases. Nevertheless, one should remember that other jurisdictions 17 and the Restatement of Torts' s
have modified the requirements so that more conduct is covered
by the broad tort of "misrepresentation." In addition, some authority indicates that a cause of action for negligent or reckless
nondisclosure of land defects exists in South Carolina. 9 One also
should remember that equitable and contractual remedies may
be available for "constructive fraud"20 or mistake. 2' Addition-

14. See e.g., Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co., 236 S.C. 272, 113 S.E.2d 817 (1960);
Eskew v. Life Ins. Co., 190 S.C. 515, 3 S.E.2d 251 (1939); Smith v. Vandiver, 149 S.C.
540, 147 S.E. 645 (1929).
15. See, e.g., Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120 (1978).
16. See, e.g., Pilkington v. McBain, 274 S.C. 312, 314-15, 262 S.E.2d 916, 918

(1980).
17. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, §§ 105-110; 37 Am.Jun. 2D Fraud &
Deceit § 206 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 25 (1943).
18. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 552-552B (negligent misrepresentation);
id. § 552C (innocent misrepresentation); cf. id. § 402B (strict liability for personal injury
caused from misrepresentation by seller of products).
19. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Morrow, 288 S.C. 298, 342 S.E.2d 400 (1986). Pruitt held
that an action for fraud existed when an inadequate foundation existed because a
stumped pit had been covered over with fill dirt. In addition the court held: "The doctrine of caveat emptor is also inapplicable in actions based upon negligent or reckless
non-disclosure of land defects. See also Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 353, [sic] which
rejects, by clear implication, caveat emptor in non-disclosure of land defect cases." Id. at
301, 342 S.E.2d at 401.
Section 353 of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, also was relied upon in Rogers v.
Scyphers, 231 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968), which is discussed infra at notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
20. "Constructive fraud" is involved when the defendant has not acted with a
knowing or reckless disregard of falsity, but the other elements of fraud are present. See
O'Quinn v. Beach Assocs., 272 S.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 734 (1978); Singleton v. Mullins Lumber Co., 234 S.C. 330, 108 S.E.2d 414 (1959); Greene v. Brown, 199 S.C. 218, 19 S.E.2d
114 (1942); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 107, at 745-48; 89 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 139159 (1955). The normal remedies in such a case would be rescission and restitution restoring the parties to the status quo ante. See D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES (1973);
G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION

§§ 30-33 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1984);

RESTATEMENT (FIRST)

OF

RESTITUTION

§§ 160-162

(1937); 66 AMt. JuR. 2D Restitution & Implied Contracts § 14 (1973); 89 C.J.S. Trusts
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ally, when a duty of due care is owed, negligent misrepresentation can give rise to a cause of action in South Carolina. 2
A full discussion of the elements of fraud is beyond the
scope of this article. Because of their close relationship to other
theories of recovery, however, three aspects of fraud will be discussed in more detail: (1) the requirement of a representation of
an existing fact; (2) the duty to disclose; and (3) the victim's
reliance. In addition to these specific aspects, two other points
concerning fraud should be kept in mind. First, fraud must be

§ 139 (1955). In addition to restitution, other equitable doctrines may be appropriate.
See Boardman v. Lovett Enters., 288 S.C. 387, 342 S.E.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1986).
21. Two contractual approaches are available. First, the representation by the defendant may constitute a warranty or a contract. In such a case, plaintiffs may seek to
enforce the contract by such traditional remedies as damages or specific performance.
Plaintiffs also may seek to reform the contract so that it conforms to the representation.
See, e.g., Crosby v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 293 S.C. 203, 359 S.E.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1987)
(reformation for unilateral mistake requires fraud and reasonable mistake or some strong
indication that enforcement without reformation would be wrongful); D. DOBBS, supra
note 20, § 9.5. Obviously, if the plaintiff elects to enforce the contract (or otherwise affirms the contract), then he may be required to perform his part of the contract and
could be held liable to a counterclaim for any unexcused nonperformance. See Turner v.
Carey, 227 S.C. 298, 87 S.E.2d 871 (1955); Baeza v. Robert E. Lee Chrysler, Plymouth,
Dodge, Inc., 279 S.C. 468, 309 S.E.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1983); see also Miller v. Premier
Corp., 608 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1979).
The second contractual approach plaintiffs may take is to seek to avoid or to rescind
the contract and be returned to the status quo ante. See O'Quinn v. Beach Assocs., 272
S.C. 95, 103-04, 249 S.E.2d 734 (1978); Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486
(1978); Burris v. Lake Wylie Marina, Inc., 285 S.C. 614, 330 S.E.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1985);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 (1979). Applying these contractual approaches may raise problems concerning the applicability of the merger doctrine. See
supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
22. According to some authority, plaintiffs may recover for negligent misrepresentation, particularly under circumstances indicating that they are owed a duty to avoid
mistake or a duty of due care. See, e.g., South Carolina State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen
& Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 346 S.E.2d 324 (1986) (consultant preparing report owes
duty of care to persons "directly" and foreseeably injured by misstatements of fact in the
report); Gordon-Gallup Realtors v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 274 S.C. 468, 471, 265 S.E.2d 38,
40 (1980) (insurer had duty to defend suit for negligent misrepresentation); Garret v.
Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 359 S.E.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1987) (one undertaking to act as investment adviser must use due care); Winburn v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 287 S.C. 435, 339
S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1985); Pittman v. Galloway, 281 S.C. 70, 313 S.E.2d 632 (Ct. App.
1984); Henson v. Bell Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 280 S.C. 354, 312 S.E.2d 586 (Ct. App.
1984); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 552-552B. Cf. Serino v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
267 F. Supp. 396 (D.S.C. 1967); Barker v. Sauls, 289 S.C. 121, 345 S.E.2d 244 (1986)
(liability for negligent failure to purchase insurance). In South Carolina, the central issue
in negligent misrepresentation is whether the defendant owes a duty of due care. For a
general discussion of this issue, see Barker v. Sauls, 289 S.C. 121, 345 S.E.2d 244 (1986).
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shown by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.2" Nevertheless,
because of the difficulties involved in proving fraud in terms of
such elements as the seller's intent and knowledge, rules concerning admission of evidence are very liberal.24 Second, fraud
also may be used as a defense to a legal action;25 for example,
fraud in the making of a contract could bar a subsequent suit for
breach of that contract. When the defendant uses fraud as a defense, he must allege the elements in his answer and support
them with clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.26
1. Existing Fact
In order to be actionable in fraud, the representation must
be a statement (or a set of actions) 27 that concerns an existing
fact. Thus, the following normally are not actionable:
(1) mere "puffing" or "sales-talk";28
(2) statements of opinion,29 except where a special relation23. See, e.g., M.B. Kahn Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 275 S.C. 381,
384, 271 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1980).
24. See Allen-Parker Co. v. Lollis, 257 S.C. 266, 185 S.E.2d 739 (1971); Shumpert v.
Service Life & Health Ins. Co., 220 S.C. 401, 413-14, 68 S.E.2d 340, 346 (1952); Henderson v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co., 199 S.C. 100, 18 S.E.2d 605 (1942); Halsey v.
Minnesota-South Carolina Land & Timber Co., 174 S.C. 97, 116, 177 S.E. 29, 37 (1934);
Finance Corp. v. Kristiansen, 153 S.C. 168, 150 S.E. 652 (1929); Continental Jewelry Co.
v. Kerhulas, 136 S.C. 496, 134 S.E. 505 (1926); Aldridge v. Watts Mill, 131 S.C. 222, 127
S.E. 213 (1925); Suber v. Parr Shoals Power Co., 113 S.C. 317, 102 S.E. 335 (1920); Border State Lumber Co. v. Edwards, 103 S.C. 391, 88 S.E. 537 (1915); Gist v. McJunkin, 31
S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 154 (1845). Proving that the defendant knew the representation was
false and that the defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely on the representation may
be difficult. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
25. See 37 AM. JuR. 2D Fraud & Deceit §§ 222, 337-341 (1968).
26. See Byars, 237 S.C. at 554, 118 S.E.2d at 327.
27. See Carter v. Boyd Constr. Co., 255 S.C. 274, 279, 178 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1971);
Chisolm v. Gadsden, 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 220 (1847); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8,
§ 106, at 736; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 525 comment b; 37 AM. Jua. 2D Fraud &
Deceit § 42 (1968); 37 C.JS. Fraud§ 9 (1943). Deliberate concealment of material facts is
a misrepresentation. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
28. See Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973, 981 (4th Cir. 1979); 37 AM. JUR. 2D
Fraud & Deceit § 54 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 13 (1943). This aspect of fraud overlaps
with issues involving the reasonableness of the victim's reliance on the representation.
See infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 109, at
757, notes that denying liability for "puffing" is akin to a privilege to lie, and therefore,
courts have been generous in allowing "puffing" cases to go to the jury.
29. See Gilbert v. Mid-South Mach. Co., 267 S.C. 211, 227 S.E.2d 189 (1976); Williams v. Bruce, 110 S.C. 421, 96 S.E. 905 (1918); Winburn v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 287
S.C. 435, 339 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1985); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 109; RE-
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ship exists or the opinion involves factual matters;
(3) predictions of future events, 3 unless the prediction is
simply a lie or is based upon special knowledge;3 2
(4) promises (followed by breach of contract),33 as opposed
to: (1) a knowing or reckless misrepresentation about one's intention to perform the contract which conduct may constitute
"fraud in the inducement" of the contract,3 4 or (2) a "breach of
35
contract with fraudulent intent";
supra note 10, §§ 538A, 539, 542-543; 37 Am. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit §§ 4556 (1968); see also Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1979).
30. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 538A, 539; 37 Am. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit
§8 49-53 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 10 (1943).
31. See Whitman v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 107 S.C. 200, 92 S.E. 861 (1917); see also
Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1979); 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit
88 57-59 (1968).
32. See Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973, 981 (4th Cir. 1979); 37 AM. JUR. 2D
Fraud & Deceit § 59 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 11 (1943).
33. See Woodward v. Todd, 270 S.C. 82, 86, 240 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1978); Vann v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 257 S.C. 217, 185 S.E.2d 363 (1971); Dailey v. American Inst. of
Mkts. Sys., Inc., 256 S.C. 550, 553, 183 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1971); Moye v. Wilson Motors,
Inc., 254 S.C. 471, 480, 176 S.E.2d 147, 152 (1970); Davis v. Upton, 250 S.C. 288, 291, 157
S.E.2d 567, 568 (1967); Willard v. Chrysler Corp., 248 S.C. 42, 46, 148 S.E.2d 867, 868
(1966); Page v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 59, 64, 5 S.E.2d 454, 455 (1939); Winburn v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 287 S.C. 435, 440, 339 S.E.2d 142, 145 (Ct. App. 1985); Emerson
v. Powell, 283 S.C. 293, 296, 321 S.E.2d 629, 631 (Ct. App. 1984); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 8, § 109; Torts, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 8 S.C.L.Q. 135 (1955);
37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud& Deceit §§ 57-67 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 11 (1943).
34. Fraud in the inducement of a contract exists when one promises to do an act in
the future, but has no intention of performing the act. Such fraud is actionable as with
any other fraud. See Buzhardt v. Cromer, 272 S.C. 159, 163, 249 S.E.2d 898, 900 (1978);
Davis v. Upton, 250 S.C. 288, 291, 157 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1967); Willard v. Chrysler Corp.,
248 S.C. 42, 148 S.E.2d 867 (1966); Page v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 59, 64-65, 5
S.E.2d 454, 456 (1939); Branham v. Wilson Motor Co., 188 S.C. 1, 198 S.E. 417 (1938);
Cook v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 186 S.C. 77, 84, 194 S.E. 636, 639 (1938); Ford v. Ball, 178
S.C. 111, 117, 182 S.E. 319, 321 (1935); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 109; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 530; 37 Am. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit §§ 26-40, 68-72 (1968).
35. Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 287 S.C. 51, 336 S.E.2d 502 (Ct.
App. 1985), summarizes the three elements of breach of contract with fraudulent intent
as follows:
(1) A breach of contract. In the absence of a breach of contract, the plaintiff's
proper cause of action will generally be for fraud in the inducement.
(2) Fraudulent intent relating to the breaching of the contract and not
merely to its making. Fraudulent intent is normally proved by circumstances
surrounding the breach.
(3) A fraudulent act accompanying the breach. The fraudulent act may be
prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the breach of contract, but it
must be connected with the breach itself and cannot be too remote in either
time or character.
Id. at 53-54, 336 S.E.2d at 503-04 (citations omitted).
STATEMENT,
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(5) statements of law,3" except when one deliberately takes
advantage of the ignorance of others3 7 or when a "factual" matter actually is involved 38 - for example, when a seller or lessor
knows "as a fact" that he is mistating zoning restrictions. 9
2. Falsity, Half-Truths, and the Duty to Disclose

In determining whether "falsity" exists, two types of issues
often arise. First, some cases involve ambiguities and "halftruths" - a statement that is literally true but, in the context of

The fraudulent act, referred to in the third element,
is any act characterized by dishonesty in fact, unfair dealing, or the unlawful
appropriation of another's property by design ....
Fraud, in this sense, "assumes so many hues and forms, that courts are compelled to content themselves with comparatively few general rules for its discovery and defeat, and
allow the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case to bear heavily upon
the conscience and judgment of the court or jury in determining its presence or
absence."
Harper v. Ethridge, 290 S.C. 112, 119, 348 S.E.2d 374, 378 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117 S.C. 137, 108 S.E.2d 189 (1921)).
Since a breach of contract is an element of the cause of action, an "action for breach
of contract accompanied by fraudulent act is an action ex contractu, not ex delicto[;]
however, it partakes of elements of both contract and tort." Peeples v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 244 S.C. 173, 178, 135 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1964) (citation omitted). A separate
action for fraud may be brought for the fraudulent act. See id. Given this overlap, the
plaintiff must elect one cause of action; however, timing of the election depends upon the
circumstances. See Riddle v. Pitts, 283 S.C. 387, 324 S.E.2d 59 (1984).
If a breach of contract is accomplished by a fraudulent intent and accompanied by a
fraudulent act, then punitive damages may be recovered. See Ateyeh v. Volkswagen of
Florence, Inc., 288 S.C. 101, 341 S.E.2d 378 (1986); Peeples v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
244 S.C. 173, 135 S.E.2d 845 (1964); Moody v. Stem, 214 S.C. 45, 55, 51 S.E.2d 163, 16667 (1948); McCullough v. American Workmen, 200 S.C. 84, 20 S.E.2d 640 (1942); Holland
v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 166 S.C. 454, 466, 165 S.E. 203, 207 (1932); Givens v.
North Augusta Elec. & Improvement Co., 91 S.C. 417, 424, 74 S.E. 1067, 1070 (1912);
Prince v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 S.C. 187, 57 S.E. 766 (1907); Welborn v. Dixon, 70
S.C. 108, 115, 49 S.E. 232, 234 (1904); Scott v. Mid-Carolina Homes, Inc., 293 S.C. 191,
359 S.E.2d 291 (Ct. App. 1987); Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 287 S.C.
51, 336 S.E.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1985).
36. See Moody v. Stem, 214 S.C. 45, 60, 51 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1949); First Nat'l Bank
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 207 S.C. 15, 30, 35 S.E.2d 47, 59 (1945); Koon v.
Pioneer-Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 175 S.C. 117, 121, 178 S.E. 503, 504 (1935); 37 AM. Jun. 2D
Fraud & Deceit §§ 73-80 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 55 (1943).
37. See Moody v. Stem, 214 S.C. 45, 60, 51 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1949) (Oxner, J., concurring); Koon v. Pioneer-Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 175 S.C. 117, 121-22, 178 S.E. 503, 504
(1935); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 55 (1943).
38. See 37 AM. Jun. 2D Fraud & Deceit §§ 78-80 (1968).
39. See National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 621, 298
N.Y.S.2d 499, 246 N.E.2d 351 (1969).
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the situation involved, can result in a misrepresentation. The
general rule is that such a statement is a false misrepresentation
when its maker knows that the statement may be interpreted in
a false way.40 Second, some cases address the question of
whether silence can constitute a "false representation." In other
words, does a defendant have a duty to disclose facts? Absent
such a duty, nondisclosure is not fraudulent. 41 Normally, the

parties to a transaction do not owe any duty of disclosure to one
another.42 Exceptions to this rule include: when a party has a
fiduciary relationship;43 when a party knows material facts that
cannot be discovered by the other party;44 or when fair dealing
would require disclosure.45 In addition, deliberate concealment
can constitute misrepresentation.46
These rules have been applied in a number of cases involving sales of residences. For example, a developer that has used
unsuitable land-fill materials has a duty to disclose this condi-

40. See Thermoid Rubber Co. v. Bank of Greenwood, 1 F.2d 891, 894 (4th Cir.
1924); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 106, at 736-37; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10,

§§ 527, 529; 37 Am. JuL 2D Fraud & Deceit § 183 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 17 (1943).
41. See Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967); Gordon v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 238 S.C. 438, 450, 120 S.E.2d 509, 515 (1961); Warr v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 237 S.C. 121, 127, 115 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1960); Holly Hill Lumber Co. v.
McCoy, 201 S.C. 427, 437, 23 S.E.2d 372, 376 (1942); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8,
§ 106; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 551; 37 AM. JuL 2D Fraud & Deceit §§ 144-176

(1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud §§ 15 (1943).
42. See supra note 41; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 106; 37 AM.

Fraud& Deceit, §§ 144-176; 37 C.J.S. Fraud §§ 15-16 (1943).
43. See Burwell v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 40, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790
(1986) (normal banker-depositor arrangement does not create fiduciary relationship);
Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120 (1978); 37 Am. Jur 2D Fraud & Deceit
88 146, 149 (1968).
44. See Pruitt v. Morrow, 288 S.C. 298, 342 S.E.2d 400 (1986) (inadequate landfill
case; subdivider concealed condition from ignorant purchaser); Lawson v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C. 477, 485, 193 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1972) (Lawson II) (inadequate landfill); Lawson v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 255 S.C. 517, 180 S.E.2d 206 (1971) (Lawson 1)
(insect infestation); May v. Hopkinson, 289 S.C. 549, 557, 347 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ct. App.
1986) (deliberate concealment of termite damage).
45. See Hester v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 268 F. Supp. 623 (D.S.C. 1967)
(rescission for unilateral mistake); MacFarlane v. Manly, 274 S.C. 392, 264 S.E.2d 838
(1980); Gardner v. Nash, 225 S.C. 303, 309, 82 S.E.2d 123, 127 (1954); see also supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Cf. Scott v. Mid Carolina Homes, Inc., 293 S.C. 191,
199, 359 S.E.2d 291, 296 (Ct. App. 1987) (rescission for unilateral mistake).
46. See Pruitt v. Morrow, 288 S.C. 298, 342 S.E.2d 400 (1986); Landvest Ass'n v.
Owens, 276 S.C. 22, 274 S.E.2d 433 (1981); Lawson v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C.
477, 193 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1972); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 550; 37 Ass. Jur 2D
Fraud & Deceit §§ 144-176 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 15 (1943).
JUR. 2D
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tion to a purchaser because the purchaser cannot reasonably discover the condition.47 Similarly, a seller must inform a buyer
about termite damage known to the seller if the damage is not
discoverable upon reasonable inspection.""
3. Reliance by the Victim
In order to establish a fraud claim, the victim must rely on
the misrepresentation. Thus, ignorance of falsity is an element
of the tort of fraud. 0 If the plaintiff knew that the misrepresentation was false, then she has no cause of action because her
conduct could not have been in reliance on the truth of the
statement. 1 Similarly, no reliance exists when the plaintiff
would have undertaken the transaction regardless of whether
the representation was true; in that situation, the cause of action
for fraud must fail. 52 Finally, when the plaintiff, despite the inducement, only did what he was legally required to do in any
''
event, he was not "fraudulently induced to do so. 5s

In addition to the requirement of actual reliance, the plaintiff also must have a "right" to rely on the misrepresentation. In
47. See Pruitt v. Morrow, 288 S.C. 298, 342 S.E.2d 400 (1986) (inadequate landfill
case; subdivider concealed condition from ignorant purchaser); Lawson v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C. 477, 485, 193 S.E.2d 124 (1972) (Lawson II) (inadequate landfill).
48. See Cohen v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 402-03, 192 S.E.2d 204, 205 (1972) (insect
infestation); Lawson v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 255 S.C. 517, 180 S.E.2d 206 (1971)
(Lawson I) (insect infestation); May v. Hopkinson, 289 S.C. 549, 556, 347 S.E.2d 508, 513
(Ct. App. 1986) (deliberate concealment of termite damage).
49. See Flowers v. Price, 190 S.C. 392, 3 S.E.2d 38 (1939); Williams v. Haverty
Furniture Co., 182 S.C. 100, 104, 188 S.E. 512, 513 (1936); see also Griffin v. Heinitsch,
309 F. Supp. 1028 (D.S.C. 1970); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 537; 37 AM. Jun. 2D
Fraud & Deceit §§ 223-235 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 29 (1943). But see Frist v. Gallant,
240 F. Supp. 827 (D.S.C. 1965) (recovery allowed for fraud when perjury resulted in judicial decision that harmed plaintiff).
50. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
51. See Moorhead v. First Piedmont Bank & Trust Co., 273 S.C. 356, 256 S.E.2d
414 (1979); see also Shaw v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 115 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1941);
RESTATEMENT,

supra note 10, §§ 541, 548.

52. See Warren v. Peeples, 183 S.C. 238, 190 S.E. 740 (1937); Thackston v. Shelton,
178 S.C. 240, 182 S.E. 436 (1935).
53. See M.B. Kahn Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 275 S.C. 381, 385,
271 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1980). While the principle concerning legal duty expressed in the
text is reasonable and well established, its application can result in occasional differences
in opinion and questionable results. See, e.g., id. at 385-89, 271 S.E.2d at 416-18 (Little-

john, J., dissenting);

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS

§§ 251, 252, 252 illustration 1

(1979).
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5
other words, the reliance must be "legitimate" or "reasonable." "
One source of difficulty concerning the reasonableness of the victim's reliance arises when the victim could have discovered the
falsity. In such cases the court is forced to balance two competing policies. As stated by the South Carolina Supreme Court in

55
Thomas v. American Workmen:

The policy of the Courts is, on the one hand, to suppress fraud,
and on the other, not to encourage negligence and inattention
to one's own interest. Either course has obvious dangers. But
the unmistakable drift is toward the just doctrine that a
wrongdoer cannot shield himself from liability by asking the
law to condemn the credulity of the ignorant and unwary.
In developing this "just doctrine," the court noted in J.B. Colt
56

Co. v. Britt:

Conceding that there are serious difficulties in the way of testing the conduct of a defrauded person by the application of the
standard prescribed to determine the existence of negligence,
viz., the due care of the man of ordinary reason and prudence,
since the victim of fraud may be not the less but the more entitled to relief because he is incapable of exercising the care of
the man of ordinary sense and prudence, and granting that
mere negligence or inadvertent failure to exercise due care,
when such failure is induced by a fraudulent representation of
the adversary, should not on principle debar the negligent
party from asserting a right to relief on the ground of fraud,
nevertheless, if, under the facts of the particular case, the conduct of the party who pleads fraud may soundly be held to
have amounted to a reckless or conscious disregard of his duty

54. The legitimacy of reliance overlaps considerably with the materiality of the

representation. See

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 10, § 538. Legitimacy also overlaps with

the requirement of "existing fact" because, for example, a reasonable person would not
rely on "puffing." See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. As indicated infra in
note 68, the standard for measuring the legitimacy of reliance should be distinguished
carefully from the standard relevant to the determination of whether a duty to disclose

exists.
55. 197 S.C. 178, 182, 14 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1941). See 37 Am. JuR. 2D Fraud& Deceit
§ 247 (1968). Dean Prosser notes that the requirement that reliance be reasonable also
serves as a way to corroborate plaintiff's claim. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8,
§ 108, at 749-50.
56. 129 S.C. 226, 123 S.E. 845 (1924). For a different test, see Unlimited Servs., Inc.
v. Macklen Enters., Inc., No. 1287 Davis Adv. Sh. No. 3 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1989)
("normally prudent person" test).
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to avail himself of the opportunity and means at hand to protect his own interests, there would seem to be no valid reason
for not applying the principle, recognized in this jurisdiction,
that where one is injured by a willful wrong and his own willful
or reckless misconduct has contributed to his injury as a proximate cause, he should not be permitted to recover. . .. [W]hat
conduct constitutes a reckless or conscious failure to exercise
such prudence, will depend upon the various circumstances involved, such as the form and materiality of the representation,
the respective intelligence, experience, age, and mental and
physical condition of the parties, the relation and respective
knowledge and means of knowledge of the parties, etc. 7
Thus, South Carolina is in accord with the general rule58 that

the victim has a right to rely so long as he is not reckless or
grossly negligent. Since the defendant has engaged in either

knowing or reckless misconduct, this rule has considerable appeal. Even if the victim is reckless, such recklessness must cause

the reliance.59
Although legitimacy of reliance is a jury issue to be resolved
in terms of the unique facts of each case, 60 several typical exam-

ples should illustrate the application of this rule. First, in absence of a fiduciary relationship, 6 ' it is reckless for a literate per-

son to sign a contract or to rely on another's interpretation of a
document without reading it himself6 2 unless there is no mean-

57. Id. at 234-35, 123 S.E. at 848.
58. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 108; 37 AM. JuR. 2D Fraud & Deceit
§ 250 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud §§ 28-39 (1943). But see RESTATEMENT, supra note 10,
§§ 540-545A.
59. See, e.g., Lawlor v. Scheper, 232 S.C. 94, 101 S.E.2d 269 (1957) (no liability for
failure to search title when that search would not have revealed inadequacies).
60. See Elders v. Parker, 286 S.C. 228, 332 S.E.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1985); Starkey v.
Bell, 281 S.C. 308, 313, 315 S.E.2d 153, 158 (Ct. App. 1984).
61. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Burwell v. South Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 340 S.E.2d 786 (1986).
62. See Burwell, 288 S.C. 34, 340 S.E.2d 786; Woodward v. Todd, 270 S.C. 82, 240
S.E.2d 641 (1978); Evans v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 584, 239 S.E.2d 76
(1977); Doub v. Weathersby Breeland Ins. Agency, 268 S.C. 319, 233 S.E.2d 111 (1977);
Lundy v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 256 S.C. 506, 183 S.E.2d 335 (1971); Moye v.
Wilson Motors, Inc., 254 S.C. 471, 176 S.E.2d 147 (1970); Maw v. McAlister, 252 S.C.
280, 166 S.E.2d 203 (1969); Parnell v. United Am. Ins. Co., 246 S.C. 26, 142 S.E.2d 204
(1965); Gordon v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 238 S.C. 438, 120 S.E.2d 509 (1961); Reid v.
George Washington Life Ins. Co., 234 S.C. 599, 109 S.E.2d 577 (1959); Branham v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co., 220 S.C. 67, 66 S.E.2d 451 (1951); O'Connor v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 217 S.C. 442, 60 S.E.2d 884 (1950); Souba v. Life Co., 187 S.C. 311, 197
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ingful opportunity to do so. 63 An illiterate person or a person
suffering from physical or financial difficulties, however, justifiably and reasonably may trust a salesman's statements about the
contents of a contract even though it is, perhaps, imprudent to
trust the salesman's representations.6 4 Similarly, if purchasers of
vending machines could easily determine that the locations of
the machines were unsatisfactory, then their lack of investigation may be considered reckless, and they cannot recover for
fraud. 65 On the other hand, if the purchaser of a business could
not easily determine the existence and contents of business
records, he can recover for fraud even if he did not investigate

S.E. 826 (1938); Able v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 186 S.C. 381, 195 S.E. 652
(1938); Dukes v. Life Ins. Co., 184 S.C. 500, 193 S.E. 36 (1937); Hood v. Life & Casualty
Ins. Co., 173 S.C. 139, 175 S.E. 76 (1934); Frierson v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 168 S.C.
178, 167 S.E. 232 (1933); J.B. Colt Co. v. Britt, 129 S.C. 226, 123 S.E. 845 (1924). But see
South v. Sherwood Chevrolet, Inc., 277 S.C. 372, 287 S.E.2d 490 (1982); Stevens v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 260 S.C. 390, 196 S.E.2d 117 (1973); Grayson v. Fidelity Life Ins.
Co., 114 S.C. 130, 103 S.E. 477 (1920) (reasonableness of reliance without reading document over a nine-year period held to be jury issue even though no evidence of illiteracy
or other infirmity); Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 287 S.C. 51, 336 S.E.2d
502 (Ct. App. 1985) (suit for fraudulent breach of contract allowed even though plaintiff
knowingly signed a financing agreement containing blanks where dollar amounts would
be entered).
63. See, e.g., Hutto v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 259 S.C. 170, 191
S.E.2d 7 (1972); Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co., 236 S.C. 272, 113 S.E.2d 817 (1960);
Giles v. Lanford & Gibson, Inc., 285 S.C. 285, 290, 328 S.E.2d 916, 919 (Ct. App. 1985)
(policy so "confusing, if not incomprehensible," that reasonable person could not ascertain his rights by reading it).
64. See Brown v. All Am. Life & Casualty Co., 271 S.C. 442, 247 S.E.2d 812 (1978)
(insurance release secured by taking advantage of financial and physical condition of
insured); Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d 129 (1965); Weatherford
v. Home Fin. Co., 225 S.C. 313, 82 S.E.2d 196 (1954); Shumpert v. Service Life & Health
Ins. Co., 220 S.C. 401, 68 S.E.2d 340 (1951); Thomas v. American Workmen, 197 S.C.
178, 14 S.E.2d 886 (1941); Crosby v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 167 S.C. 255, 166 S.E.
266 (1932); Baldwin v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 78 S.C. 419, 57 S.E. 67 (1907); Austin v.
Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 296 S.C. 156, 370 S.E.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1988); see
also Fudge v. Physicians Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1955).
65. Jones v. Cooper, 234 S.C. 477, 109 S.E.2d 5 (1959). See Watts v. Monarch
Builders, Inc., 272 S.C. 517, 252 S.E.2d 889 (1979); O'Shields v. Southern Fountain Mobile Homes, Inc., 262 S.C. 276, 204 S.E.2d 50 (1974); Williams v. Bruce, 110 S.C. 421, 96
S.E. 905 (1918); Columbia Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. True, 108 S.C. 56, 93 S.E. 389
(1917); Whitman v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 107 S.C. 200, 92 S.E. 861 (1917); King v.
Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 318 S.E.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Hester v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., 287 F. Supp. 957 (D.S.C. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 412 F.2d 505
(4th Cir. 1969). But see South v. Sherwood Chevrolet, Inc., 277 S.C. 372, 374-77, 287
S.E.2d 490, 491 (1982) (Harwell, J., dissenting) (jury verdict upheld despite facts
strongly indicating plaintiff's "reckless disregard"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 540.
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the records. 66 Accordingly, when the seller's agent makes representations based on assertions of special knowledge about the
house being sold, the buyer justifiably can rely on the representation when the truth about the condition of the house is not
reasonably ascertainable.6
Based on the principles noted above, a home buyer may
have some duty to inspect the house for defects prior to buying

it. When the buyer could not be expected to discover the defects
easily, the seller may be liable for fraud if the seller is aware of

the hidden defects and the buyer's problems of discovery, but
does not inform the buyer.6 8 Likewise, when the seller deliberately conceals a defect, he is liable for fraud if the buyer could
not be expected to discover the concealed defect.6 9 Conversely,
when the buyer could easily discover a concealed defect, he
likely would not have an action for fraud. °
C.

Negligence

In Rogers v. Scyphers71 South Carolina recognized a negligence action for personal injuries brought against the buildervendor of a new house. The supreme court held that one in the
business of building and selling new houses is liable for personal

66. See Gilbert v. Mid-South Mach. Co., 267 S.C. 211, 227 S.E.2d 189 (1976); accord Byrn v. Walker, 275 S.C. 83, 267 S.E.2d 601 (1980); Tallevast v. Herzog, 225 S.C.
563, 83 S.E.2d 204 (1954). Cf. Elders v. Parker, 286 S.C. 228, 332 S.E.2d 563 (Ct. App.
1985) (widow allowed to recover for fraud when her credulity and romantic involvement
made her easy prey). For discussion of the defendant's duty of disclosure, see supra
notes 41.48 and accompanying text.
67. See Byrn v. Walker, 275 S.C. 83, 88, 267 S.E.2d 601, 603-04 (1980).
68. See supra notes 44, 47-48. One should note that the seller's duty of disclosure
is based on the seller's awareness that a defect cannot be discovered by reasonable inspection. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. In contrast, the standard for
legitimacy of the buyer's reliance is gross negligence or recklessness. See supra notes 5659 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 46, 47-48 and accompanying text. For discussion of distinction
between standard for determining the existence of duty of disclosure by seller and for
determining the legitimacy of reliance, see supra note 68.
70. See supra notes 54-55, 65 and accompanying text.
71. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968) (noted in Comment, Real Property-Liability of Builder-Vendor After Conveyance, 20 S.C.L. REv. 868 (1968)). The
plaintiff, the purchaser's wife, alleged she was injured when she fell on a defectively installed, folding attic staircase. The defendant was engaged in the construction of a small
subdivision, and an independent contractor had done the work in question. See generally Annotation, Liability of Builder-Vendor or Other Vendor of New Dwelling for Loss,
Injury, or Damage Occasioned by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3D 383 (1969).
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injuries sustained as a result of defective construction caused by
the builder's negligent failure to discover or to disclose defects.72
In permitting the purchaser's wife to recover, the court also disposed of any requirement of privity. The court held that the tort
liability of a builder-vendor for negligent construction after acceptance extends to the purchaser and others who foreseeably
will occupy the premises.
The defendant in Rogers was both the builder and the seller
of the house involved. Logically, a person who was only a builder
or only a seller also would owe a duty of due care to persons who
foreseeably might be injured by negligence. Furthermore, South
Carolina authority supports recovery for negligence by persons
who are negligent in designing a building or in supervising its
construction. 3
A more difficult problem arises when the victim of negligence suffers "pure economic loss" rather than injury to person
or property. Such pure economic loss is involved, for example,
when negligence has resulted in a flaw in the house, such as
peeling paint on the exterior siding. As will be discussed below,
reason exists to believe that such loss may be recoverable, but
there are also contrary indications.
Two supreme court cases support the view that pure economic loss is recoverable. Terlinde v. Neely 74 involved claims for

economic loss caused by substantial settlement of the foundation of the plaintiff's house. 75 The court held that the plaintiff, a

72. In imposing a duty of reasonable disclosure, the Rogers court relied on REsupra note 10, § 353. See 251 S.C. at 133, 161 S.E.2d at 83. Section 353
provides:
(1) A vendor of land who . . . fails to disclose . . . any condition . . .
which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land is subject to liability
to the vendee ... if (a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of
the condition. . . and (b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition . ...
Some decisions from other jurisdictions cited by the court were some based on implied
warranty, but the court found that the issue of implied warranty was not raised in
Rogers.
73. See, e.g., Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); Hill v. Polar
Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951); Avent v. Proffitt, 109 S.C. 48, 95 S.E. 134
(1918). Broome is discussed infra in note 114 and Hill is discussed in more detail infra in
STATEMENT,

note 108.
74. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).

75. As a result of the settlement:
Cracks began to appear in the sheetrock walls of the house; the floor began to
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subsequent purchaser, could recover from a builder-seller under
both implied warranty76 and in negligence77 for such loss. Brown
v. Sandwood Development Corp.78 held that the vendor-subdivider of residential lots was liable for breaching an implied warranty of fitness79 and for negligence for allegedly designing and
constructing a concrete dam spillway in an unreasonable manner. s0 The plaintiffs were owners of residential lots surrounding
the pond where the spillway was located, and they suffered economic loss when the dam collapsed as a result of inadequacies in
the spillway.8' Although these cases indicate that a negligence
cause of action exists for economic loss, they did not explicitly
address the issue.
Two subsequent cases by the court of appeals, one of which
specifically considers the issue of liability for pure economic loss,
suggest possible doubt regarding a negligence cause of action for
such loss. In McGann v. Mungo8 residents and owners of improved residential lots sued the developer-subdivider for negligence in the design and construction of roads and drainage systems.6 The court of appeals held: "The question of whether the

sink away from the interior walls; doors would not close properly; the brick
veneer on the exterior of the house began to crack and separate at the mortar
joints; and, upon closer inspection, pillars underneath the house were sinking
away from the supporting beams of the floor. An inspection and evaluation by
qualified experts indicates that the footings of the house were built on "fill
dirt". Estimates to repair the existing damage and remedy all of the cause of
the settlement ranged from $5,916.00 to $22,978.73.
Id. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 768-69.
76. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
77. See Terlinde, 275 S.C. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770. In allowing "the imposition of
tort liability to a third party as a result of contractual obligations despite the absence of
privity between the tortfeasor and the third party," the court noted:
The plaintiffs, being a member of the class for which the home was constructed, are entitled to a duty of care in construction commensurate with industry standards. In the light of the fact that the home was constructed as
speculative, the home builder cannot reasonably argue he envisioned anything
but a class of purchasers. By placing this product into the stream of commerce,
the builder owes a duty of care to those who will use his product, so as to
render him accountable for negligent workmanship.
Id.
78. 277 S.C. 581, 291 S.E.2d 375 (1982).
79. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
80. 277 S.C. 581, 583-84, 291 S.E.2d 375, 376-77 (1982).
81. Id. at 585, 291 S.E.2d at 377.
82. 287 S.C. 561, 340 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1986).
83. Id. at 565, 573-75, 340 S.E.2d at 156, 161. The complaint asserted seven differ-
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instant action may be maintained. .. remains, so far as we can
tell, one of novel impression in this state . .. We therefore decline to decide the issue on demurrer.

84

McGann explicitly cites

Development5

Sandwood
but does not indicate why that case
was not determinative.
In Carolina Winds Owners' Association v. Joe Harden
Builder, Inc.86 the court of appeals held that Terlinde did not
apply when the builder was not also the vendor. In barring
plaintiffs' negligence claim for damages resulting from faulty
construction, the court applied the "economic loss rule" quite
literally.8 7
D. Implied Warranty
1. The Implied Warranty of Habitabilityand of

ent causes of action. See id. at 565, 340 S.E.2d at 156.
84. Id. at 574-75, 340 S.E.2d at 161.
85. Id. at 574, 340 S.E.2d at 161.
86. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), afl'd on rehearing,No. 25 Davis
Adv. Sh. No. 21 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988), cert. denied - S.C. -, - S.E.2d .
(1989) (parties had settled). "[T]he builder in Terlinde built the house for speculation,
not pursuant to a contract for its construction. He placed it in the stream of commerce
by initial sale. In our view, Terlinde must be limited to its facts. . . . It has no application to this case." Id. at 83, 374 S.E.2d at 903. The court's holding was based in part on
Arvai v. Shaw, 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986), which held that the implied warranty
of habitability was grounded on the sale of a house and that, therefore, a builder who
was not also a seller was not liable under this warranty claim. Arvai is discussed infra at
notes 104, 105 and accompanying text. In its Order on Rehearing (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30,
1988), the court of appeals refused to reconsider or distinguish Arvai because it lacks
authority to overrule or change the law as declared by the decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court. No. 1192 Davis Adv. Sh. No. 25 (S.C. Dec. 24, 1988), at 22.
87. "The 'economic loss rule' . . . states that an action will not lie in tort for a
product [or construction] defect without a claim of injury to the person or other property
of the plaintiff." Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 80, 374 S.E.2d at 901. The court dismissed
the significance of the risk of potential personal injury that has not yet in fact resulted.
Id. at 86-87, 374 S.E.2d 904. Earlier federal cases interpreting South Carolina law have
made the application of the "economic loss rule" turn on this distinction. Compare 2000
Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1186 (4th Cir. 1986) (South Carolina
law would not permit negligence action for defects that only shortened life expectancy of
roof and destroyed its aesthetic appeal, resulting in economic loss) with City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) ("We think that the South
Carolina courts would be willing to extend tort liability to the [asbestos] manufacturer
whose product threatens a substantial and unreasonable risk of harm by releasing toxic
substances into the environment, thereby causing damage to the property owner who has
installed the harmful product in his building.").
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Workmanlike Construction
Rutledge v. Dodenhofj s involved an action by the purchaser
of a new house against the builder-vendor for damages to the
house caused by the overflow of a septic tank that allegedly had
been designed improperly. The South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the doctrine of caveat emptor is inapplicable to such a
transaction and that "in the sale of a new house by the buildervendor there is an implied warranty that the house was built in
a reasonably workmanlike manner and is reasonably suitable for
habitation."89 Since warranty liability is not based on negligence,
due care was irrelevant, and the question of whether the case
could have been won in negligence was moot."0
Since the defendant in Rutledge was both the builder and
seller, the court did not need to consider the nature of the warranty in detail. In particular, the opinion did not consider
whether the law implied one warranty, which encompasses both
workmanlike manner and habitability, or whether two warranties were involved, a warranty of workmanship and a warranty
of habitability.
Although subsequent cases have not addressed this issue explicitly, there are three reasons for concluding that two warranties may be involved. First, authority supports an implied warranty of workmanship by a person who only plans and
supervises the construction of a building.9 1 Second, many cases
following Rutledge have imposed a warranty of habitability on
sellers solely because of their role of being a seller; they have no
role in building the house and, therefore, there is no workmanship involved.9 2 Third, some policy concerns involved in the
cases apply to only one of the two warranties.9 Because of these

88. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
89. Id. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795; Annotation, Liability of Builder-Vendor or Other
Vendor of New Dwellings for Loss, Injury or Damage Occasioned by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R.3D 383 (1969).
90. Liability for breach of an implied warranty, irrespective of the defendant's
fault, is an established principle of warranty law. See Patterson v. Orangeburg Fertilizer
Co., 117 S.C. 140, 152, 108 S.E. 401, 405 (1921). Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314 (Law. Coop. 1976) (implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 36-2-315 (implied warranty of fit-

ness for particular use).
91. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 108, 109 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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reasons, the following discussion considers each warranty
separately.
a. The Implied Warranty of Habitability
Rutledge was followed by Lane v. Trenholm Building Co. 4
In Lane the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability was applied to the sale of a new house by a subdivision developer that
had acquired the house when the builder went out of business.
Even though the developer was not the builder, the plaintiffbuyer was entitled to the warranty because the warranty
"springs from the sale itself":
Trenholm placed the house in the stream of commerce and exacted a fair price for it. Its liability is not founded upon fault,
but because it has profited by receiving a fair price and, as between it and an innocent purchaser, the innocent purchaser
should be protected from latent defects 5
Terlinde v. Neely9" took this ruling a step further and held
that the implied warranty of habitability is not limited by privity requirements. Terlinde involved a suit against a builderseller by the subsequent purchaser of a three-year-old house
that suffered damage because the house footings were built on
fill dirt. The court extended the warranty to this plaintiff and
stated:
The extension of implied warranties to subsequent purchasers
is based upon sound legal and policy considerations ....

Com-

mon experience teaches that latent defects in a house will not
manifest themselves for a considerable period of time, likely as
alleged in this case, after the original purchaser has sold the
property to a subsequent unsuspecting buyer ....

The fact

that the subsequent purchaser did not know the home builder,
as did the original purchaser, does not negate the reality of the
"holding out" of the builder's expertise and reliance which occurs in the market place.17

The warranty of habitability is subject to two limitations.
94. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976) (defective septic tank).
95. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
96. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
97. Id. at 397-98, 271 S.E.2d at 769. The warranty extended "to subsequent home
purchasers for a reasonable amount of time." Id. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

First, it only applies to improved realty.es The warranty, how-

ever, is not limited to houses; it has been applied to sales of improved residential realty involving only such improvements as a
dam and spillway.9 Second, the doctrine only applies to the
original seller who put the home in the stream of commerce. It
does not apply necessarily to builders, 10 0 nor does it apply to
later owners, T10 who, in effect, are selling a used house.
This second limitation was developed initially in Cohen v.
Blessing,0 2 which involved a suit against the seller of a used
house. The court limited the doctrine of caveat venditor to the
sale of new houses and refused to impose an implied warranty
when an owner-occupant sold a used house. This limit is a typical curb on the expansion of consumer protection and is analo-

gous to courts' reluctance to impose strict tort liability or warranty on persons not in the business of selling the product
involved. 10 3 A similar reluctance exists when used goods are
involved. 04
The limitation of the warranty to sellers of new houses was
adopted in Arvai v. Shaw, 05 which barred an action against the

98. See Jackson v. River Pines, Inc., 276 S.C. 29, 274 S.E.2d 912 (1981) (plaintiff
claimed that defendant sold him a lot composed of soil that would not support a septic
tank system).
99. See Brown v. Sandwood Dev. Corp., 277 S.C. 581, 291 S.E.2d 375 (1982). Cf.
McGann v. Mungo, 287 S.C. 561, 340 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1986).
100, See Arval v. Shaw, 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986); see also infra notes
105-107, 110-112 and accompanying text.
101. See Cohen v. Blessing, 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972).
102. 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E. 204 (1972). The result when a person has extensively
renovated an older home is unclear, particularly when the person who renovated the
home is in such business.
103. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10, 36-2-104(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976); RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 402A. But see Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 503, 229
S.E.2d 728, 731 (1976) (seller liable for breach of implied warranty of habitability even
though he "may not have been a merchant"). Not only fraud, but also possibly negligence, would be available as a cause of action against the seller of a used house, at least
for injury to person or property. See supra notes 19, 22, 47-48, 71-87 and accompanying
text.
104. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314 comment 3 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("A contract for
the sale of second hand goods ... involves only such obligation as is appropriate to such
goods."). The extent of the warranty for used goods is the same as with the "as is"
disclaimer. Id. § 36-2-316; Annotation, Liability for Representationsand Express Warranties in Connection With Sale of Used Motor Vehicle, 36 A.L.R.3D 125 (1971) (express
warranties). As to strict liability for used goods, see Annotation, Strict Liability in Tort:
Liability of Seller of Used Product, 53 A.L.R.3D 337 (1973) (strict liability).
105. 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986). See also Roundtree Villas Ass'n, Inc. v.
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builder, who was not the seller. The reason for this limitation is
that
the implied warranty of habitability has its roots in the execution of a contract for sale. Indeed, in Lane we held that the
warranty springs from the sale. The determining factor is not
whether the defendant actually builds the defective house, but
that he places it, by the initial sale, into the stream of commerce. Holding the custom builder liable under an implied
warranty, where he is not also involved in the sale of the house,
would be incompatible with the law of warranty.10
The original occupant in Arvai was the first seller. As a result,
one conceivably may argue that Arvai does not apply when a
builder constructs a house or housing complex for a developer
who never was intended to be an occupant. In such a case, the
developer could be viewed as a mere conduit or middleman; the
builder, therefore, could be said to have a role "in the sale of the
house." 0 7
b. The Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Construction
The warranty of workmanlike manner is grounded on the
builder's expertise. Therefore, it applies regardless of whether

4701 King's Corp., 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984) (contract lender who is not active
in building enterprise is not liable for defects in construction under doctrine of caveat
venditor); McGann v. Mungo, 287 S.C. 561, 340 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1986) (absent allegation that defendant-developer sold houses or other improvements, property owners'
complaint failed to state cause of action for breach of implied warranty); Holder v. Haskett, 283 S.C. 247, 321 S.E.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1984) (warranty of habitability not applicable to developer and realtor who, though financially involved with the builder, were not
parties to the contract for the sale of the house and had not received any of the purchase
price paid for the house). Cf. Kincaid v. Landing Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 89, 96, 344 S.E.2d
869, 874 (Ct. App. 1986) (corporate sales and marketing agent was indistinguishable from
developer or contractor when evidence revealed "an amalgamation of corporate interests,
entities, and activities so as to blur the legal distinctions between the corporations and
their activities").
106. Arvai v. Shaw, 289 S.C. 161, 164, 345 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1986) (emphasis added).
The house in Arvai was built, not for speculation as in Terlinde, but pursuant to plans
and specifications provided by the original owner. The court, however, found this distinction not determinative of whether an implied warranty of habitability attaches. See id.
at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 717.
107. Cf. Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972) (implied warranty of
workmanlike construction extends to first purchaser when builder knows that developerseller will not occupy home).
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the builder of a structure is the seller.'08 When the builder is
also the seller, cases implying a warranty explicitly refer to his
expertise as the basis of the warranty."0 9
Although a builder, and probably other craftsmen, is liable
for breach of the warranty of workmanship, exactly to whom the
duty is owed is unclear. More precisely, even though some cases
contain broad language indicating a general rejection of privity, 1 0 they do not specify whether privity acts as limit on plaintiffs who may recover under this warranty. Resolution of this issue is important because Arvai holds that the warranty of
habitability is limited to the original seller of the home; builders
who do not inject the house into the stream of commerce have
not been held liable under this theory."' On the other hand,
builders would be liable to subsequent purchasers if the warranty of workmanship is not limited by the doctrine of privity.

108. See Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951). The plaintiff owner of the land and the building, a frozen food locker plant - sued the defendant for
negligently designing and supervising construction of the plant. In affirming a verdict for
the plaintiff, the court relied in part on the theory of an implied warranty of proper
workmanship:
It seems to be well settled that where "a person holds himself out as specially
qualified to perform work of a particular character, there is an implied warranty that the work which he undertakes shall be of proper workmanship and
reasonable fitness for its intended use, and, if a party furnishes specifications
and plans for a contractor to follow in a construction job, he thereby impliedly
warrants their sufficiency for the purpose in view. .

.

... These principles have

been applied to building contracts.
Id. at 271, 64 S.E.2d at 888 (citations omitted) (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 329 (1955)).
109. See, for example, Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 414, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795
(1970), in which the court notes: "The seller holds himself out as an expert in such construction and the prospective purchaser, if he buys, is forced to a large extent to rely on
the skill of the builder," See also Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 398, 271 S.E.2d 768,
769 (1980), in which the court observed more broadly: "The fact that the subsequent
purchaser did not know the home builder, as did the original purchaser, does not negate
the reality of the 'holding out' of the builder's expertise and reliance which occurs in the
market place."
110, See, e.g., Terlinde, 275 S.C. at 398, 271 S.E.2d at 769-70 (["In recent cases] we
indicated the concept of privity is no longer viable in this jurisdiction."). In Carolina
Winds Owners Ass'n v. Joe Harden Bldrs., Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897, aff'd on
rehearing,No. 25 Davis Adv. Sh, No. 21 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988), cert. denied, S.C. -, - S.E.2d - (1989), the court of appeals, in its Order on Rehearing, noted
that the question whether the builder's warranty of workmanlike manner should be extended "to a home buyer who is not a party to the construction contract from which the
warranty arises" had not been raised at trial and therefore was not preserved on appeal.
No. 1192 Davis Adv. Sh. No. 25 (S.C. Dec. 24, 1988), at 22.
111. See supra notes 100, 105-106 and accompanying text. But see supra note 107.
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At least one court has adopted this approach when the builder
knows that the developer, who contracts with the builder, will
not be the first occupant."'
The warranty of workmanship overlaps considerably with
the concept of negligence since both are phrased in terms of reasonable craftsmanship."' In many cases, a plaintiff might be
able to recover under either theory. In other situations - for
example, because of differences in statute of limitations"" or

112. See Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972).
113. See Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951). This case is
discussed supra note 108.
114. Since no specific statute of limitations is established for breach of warranty of
habitability, general limitations provisions for personal injury, wrongful death, property
damage, and breach of contract actions must be used. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530
(Law. Co-op. 1976). The general limitation period for such actions recently was reduced
from six years to three years as part of the South Carolina Tort Reform Act, Act No. 432
(approved April 5, 1988), amending South Carolina Code sections 15-3-530 to -535. See
id. The South Carolina version of the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725 contains a specific six-year limitations provision and does not appear to have been affected by the Tort
Reform Act. See id. § 36-2-725.
The time limit under the general statute of limitations runs from the time the wrong
was discovered or should have been discovered. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-530 to -545
(Law. Co-op. 1976); Dillon County School Dist. No. 2 v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc.,
286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct. App.) (defective building construction design case;
South Carolina courts have adopted the "discovery" rule); Brown v. Sandwood Dev.
Corp., 277 S.C. 581, 291 S.E.2d 375 (1982) (adopting the "discovery" rule). The discovery
rule was adopted judicially in Mills v. Killian, 273 S.C. 66, 70, 254 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1979)
(discovery rule represents "the more equitable and rational view"). For elaboration of
the rule, see Brown v. Sandwood Dev. Corp., 277 S.C. 581, 291 S.E.2d 375 (1982) (defective spillway), and Snell v. Columbia Gun Exch., Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333
(1981) (defective pistol). This rule now is prescribed specifically by statute for personal
injury cases. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
When contract actions are involved, the traditional rule of commercial law was that
the limitation period ran from the passage of title from the seller to buyer, typically at
the time of tender and acceptance of the product. No "discovery rule" existed in the
traditional context, and the South Carolina Code appears to follow this approach in the
general statute of limitations. See S.C. CODE ANN §§ 15-3-535 to -545 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
Now, however, the South Carolina version of the Uniform Commercial Code changes this
approach for commercial sales of goods and provides that "[a] cause of action accrues
when the breach is or should have been discovered." Id. § 36-2-725.
Statutes of limitations should be distinguished from so-called "statutes of repose."
The latter prescribe an action at a given time after sale of the product or completion of
work or the like. In 1978 the supreme court declared that a statute of repose applicable
to architects and engineers violated the equal protection clause. See Broome v. Truluck,
270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978). A special statute of repose for medical malpractice
has been upheld, however. See Hoffman v. Powell, No. 23027, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 13, at
14 (S.C. June 5, 1989); see also Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36 (1987) (special statute of limitation upheld). Recently, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted a statute of repose narrowly restricted to building and construction cases. See 1986
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only one theory may be available.

2. Basis of Implied Warranty
Judicial adoption of the implied warranty of habitability
and workmanship has been supported on two grounds. The first
ground is authority and precedent. Rutledge, for example, relied
in part on a modern trend:
The decided trend of modern decisions is to restrict the
application of caveat emptor and to hold it inapplicable to
sales where the vendor is also the builder of a new structure.
These decisions hold that a builder-vendor may be held liable
for loss or damage caused by a defective condition in the building on the theory of breach of an implied warranty of workmanship and fitness for intended use.,'
Lane relied on the well-established principle of caveat venditor,
which applies when sales of chattels are involved: "[T]his State
has consistently rejected caveat emptor and adopted the civil

law rule of caveat venditor as part of the common law of South
Carolina."
because

7

This rule was regarded as applicable to homes

the essence of the transaction is the sale of a house and not a
transfer of a parcel of land. A house is the sale of a product,
similar to the sale of personalty. Once the court recognizes the
essence of the transaction is the sale of a product with a clearly
defined proposed use, there is little reason to apply ancient
doctrines of real property law which are inconsistent with the
current and historical treatment of sales of personalty in this

S.C. Acts 2765, No. 412 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10 to -940)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (amending S.C. CODE ANN §§ 15-3-640, -660, -670 (Law. Co-op.
1976)); see also Annotation, Validity and Construction, as to Claim Alleging Design
Defects, of Statute Imposing Time Limitations Upon Action Against Architect or Engineer for Injury or Death Arising out of Defective or Unsafe Condition of Improvement
to Real Property,93 A.L.R.3D 1242 (1979); see generally Note, ProductsLiability Statutes of Repose as Conflicting with State Constitutions:The Plaintiffs Are Winning, 26
Amz. L. REv. 363 (1984); Annotation, Validity and Constructionof Statute Terminating
Right of Action for Product-CausedInjury at Fixed Period After Manufacture,Sale, or
Delivery, 25 A.L.R.4TH 641 (1983).

115. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text for discussion of whether "pure
economic loss" is recoverable in negligence.
116. Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 413, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1970).
117. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 502, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1976).
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State."'

The second reason to support the implied warranty is that
this approach is consistent with a number of relevant policies.
Identifying policies in any clear-cut way is impossible because
policies, by nature, are vague and overlapping.119 Nevertheless,
in general, two distinctive policy concerns can be identified. One
should note that these two policy concerns are not new; courts
have applied them for years. In the context of modern conditions, however, these policies indicate that caveat venditor is the
best rule. 120
The first policy concern discussed in the cases is the inequality of the parties. In particular, the courts stress that the
builder has superior expertise and that the buyer-occupant must
rely on that expertise. 21 This concern applies most obviously in

cases when the warranty of workmanship is involved. This policy, however, may not be limited to builders, craftsmen, and professionals such as architects and engineers. A developer-seller
also could be held to a level of expertise in supervising, constructing, and marketing the houses.
The second concern is that a home today is more than a
piece of realty. The buyer is concerned with receiving a habitable "home for his family,'

22

and in order to do so, he is likely to

have "invested his life savings and executed a 20, 30, or 40 year
mortgage.' 123 Both the buyer and seller know that "the essence
of the transaction is the purchase of a habitable dwelling and
1 24
that a knowledgeable inspection by the buyer is impossible.'

In this context, the parties' reasonable expectation is that the
buyer will receive a habitable residence. 25 Given this expectation, it is fair to apply the principle that a "sound price implies
118. Id. at 501, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
119. See PROSSER & KEET N, supra note 8, §§ 3-4; M. SHAPO, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING

CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN

AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984).

120. See Lane, 267 S.C. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730; Rutledge, 254 S.C. at 413, 175
S.E.2d at 795.

121. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 398, 271 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1980); Rutledge,
254 S.C. at 413-14, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
122. See Lane 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.

123. Id.
124. Rutledge, 254 S.C. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
125. See Lane, 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731; see also Rutledge, 254 S.C. at 414,
175 S.E.2d at 795.
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a sound commodity" and imply a warranty of habitability. 126
Similarly, a buyer reasonably might expect that the builder has
performed in a workmanlike manner
and, therefore, has implied
127
a warranty of workmanship.
II.

LEASES OF RESIDENCES

A.

Obligations of Lessors

1. General Rule at Common Law: Caveat Lessee
The traditional rule concerning leased property is that the
landlord has no duty to use due care to ensure that the premises
are safe. 28 Instead, the rule has been caveat lessee, which effec-29
tively means that the tenant is responsible for the premises.1
This rule is subject to a number of exceptions, which are dis-

126. See Lane, 267 S.C. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
127. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Rutledge, 254 S.C.
407, 175 S.E.2d 792; Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951).
128. See PROSSER & KEEroN, supra note 8,§ 63, at 434-35; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 10, §§ 355-356; Annotation, Modern Status of Landlord's Tort Liability for Injury
or Death of Tenant or Third Person Caused by a Dangerous Condition of the Premises,
64 A.L.R.3D 339 (1975); 49 AM. Jun. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 767-772 (1970). South
Carolina cases follow this approach. South Carolina authorities are discussed infra at
notes 132-136 and accompanying text. For a rejection of the traditional rule and the
imposition of liability based on negligence, see Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d
528 (1973).
129. See Marks v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 212 S.C. 502, 48 S.E.2d 445
(1948); PROSSER & KEEToN, supra note 8, § 63, at 434; 49 Am.Jun. 2D Landlord and
Tenant §§ 981-989 (1970). In South Carolina, the law governing sales and leases of chattels is otherwise. For discussion of the early departure in South Carolina from the common-law doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of chattels and the adoption of the civil
law maxim that a sound price warrants a sound commodity, see Lane v. Trenholm Bldg.
Co., 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980), discussed supra notes 94-95, 117-118. As to
leases of personal property, the South Carolina Court of Appeals recently held that a
lease of personal property includes implied warranties of sound quality and fitness for
use. See C. Ray Miles Constr. Co. v. Weaver, 296 S.C. 466, 373 S.E.2d 905 (Ct. App.
1988).
[I]t is clear that the implied warranty alleged in the instant case has long been
recognized in South Carolina as a matter of common law. Although implied
warranties were most often recognized in connection with contracts of sale
...,(t]here is no logical reason for any distinction between contracts of sale
and leases insofar as the recognition of implied warranties is concerned.
Id. at 472-73, 373 S.E.2d at 908. But ef. D&D Leasing Co. v. Gentry, No. 23029, Davis
Adv. Sh. No. 15 (S.C. June 10, 1989) (legislature did not intend "true leases" to be covered by Uniform Commercial Code sales article).
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cussed below.
In addition to the situations involved in these exceptions,
the landlord also may have a duty of due care based upon some
special relationship apart from his status as landlord. For example, a college has a special relationship with students, and the
duties from this relationship are distinct from those that might
arise from the college's status as a landlord who rents the student a dormitory room. Because of this relationship, when a college is a lessor, it must use due care to make dormitories safe130
even though landlords ordinarily do not have a duty to make the
premises safe. 131
The traditional rule imposing on the tenant the responsibility for the safety of the premises has been explained in terms of
the theory that a lease is viewed as a conveyance to the lessee of
an estate in land (with the lessor retaining only a reversionary
interest) and, thus, as a transfer of control of the premises.' 32
Under this theory the tenant "controls" the premises and, therefore, is rightfully responsible for their condition.' 33 On the other
hand, the traditional rule has been criticized for ignoring the realities of modern urban leases and for placing inadequate weight
on the concern for safety.3 Also, the tenant has, at most, only
as much control as an owner, yet caveat venditor applies to the
sale of homes. Because of these criticisms, some jurisdictions
have either abandoned the traditional rule or limited it by ex-

130. See, e.g., Duarte v. State, 88 Cal. App. 3d 473, 151 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1979); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983). It should be
noted that college dormitory arrangements generally are not treated as leases. See, e.g.,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-120(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976); Cook v. University Plaza, 100 Ill. App.
3d 752, 427 N.E.2d 405 (1981).
131. See infra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
132. See Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 366-67, 162 S.E.
329, 331 (1932); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 434-35; Note, Personal Injuries to the Tenant: The Landlord's Liability Therefor, 10 S.C.L. REv. 307 (1958).
133. See Hatfield v. Palles, 537 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1976). Hatfield explicitly argues
that the rule "rests upon the inability of the landlord to control the actions of the tenant
and those entering under the tenant have no right to expect the landlord to be responsible to them." Id. at 1247-48 n.1. Ability to control the tenant (as opposed to the premises), however, often is irrelevant to safety measures. For example, a landlord clearly can
control whether the electrical wiring is adequate in most cases. The argument concerning
what rights the visitor and tenant might have, of course, is question-begging since the
issue is whether either has a right to expect the landlord to use due care.
134. See, e.g., Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 435, 446.
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pansive applications of the exceptions."3 5

Thus far, South Carolina courts have followed the traditional rule and have not imposed a duty on the lessor to use due
care unless one of the exceptions to the traditional rule is applicable. 3 61 The South Carolina Legislature, however, by enacting

the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 137 has imposed a
number of changes on the common-law duties of landlords.3 5
These provisions may impose liability on landlords either for
breach of warranty or for lack of due care."3 9

2. Common-Law Exceptions to the General Rule
a. Existing or ForeseeableDanger to Those Outside the
Premises
When persons outside the premises are subjected to an unreasonable risk because of the premises' condition at the time of
lease or because of the contemplated use by the tenant, the les-

135. See Annotation, Modern Status of Landlord's Tort Liability for Injury or
Death of Tenant or Third Person Caused by Dangerous Condition of Premises, 64
A.L.R3D 339 (1975); 47 Am.JuP& 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 767-772 (1970). Some jurisdictions have imposed strict liability on landlords. See, e.g., Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal.
3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985). South Carolina, however, has rejected
strict liability. See infra notes 164-172 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 140-160 and accompanying text; Sheppard v. Nienow, 254 S.C.
44, 173 S.E.2d 343 (1970); Conner v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132
S.E.2d 385 (1963); see also Hatfield v. Palles, 537 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1976); Note, Personal Injuries to the Tenant; The Landlord's Liability in Tort Therefor, 10 S.C.L. REV.
307 (1958); Torts, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 1963-1964, 17 S.C.L. REV. 151
(1965). In addition, the Supreme Court explicitly has refused to extend warranty theory
or strict liability in tort theory to leased apartments. See infra notes 164-174 and accompanying text.
137. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). For an excellent
general discussion of the Act, see Wilcox, A Lawyer's Guide to the South CarolinaResidential Landlord and Tenant Act, 39 S.C.L. REv. 493 (1988).
138. Most of these changes involve a conceptual shift to treating the lease like a
contract with mutually dependent covenants. The Act imposes legal duties on landlords
to comply with health and safety codes, to maintain the premises in a habitable condition, and to provide essential services. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440 (Law. Co-op.
1976). Breach of one of these duties can be used as the basis for the tenant's terminating
the lease, seeking damages, or injunctive relief, or defending or counterclaiming in an
action by the landlord for rent or possession. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-610 to -640
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
139. The potential impact of this act on tort law is discussed infra at notes 176-198
and accompanying text.
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sor has been held to a duty of due care. 4 ° The justification for
this exception is that the landlord should be aware of the risk
and that the victims, being off-premises, are in no way relying
on the lessee and are unable to correct the condition. Consequently, no reason exists to frustrate the right of the public to
reasonable safety by allowing lessors to shift their responsibility
to lessees. 4 '
b.

Concealed Dangers

When the lessor knows or should know that a dangerous
condition is not obvious to the lessee, then the lessor must use
due care to disclose and warn the lessee of that latent condition. 42 Consequently, lessors will be as liable for personal injuries that result from the dangerous conditions as they would be
if they were in control of the premises, that is, as if there were
no lease involved. In addition, lessors may be liable for fraud or
misrepresentation for economic injury resulting from the concealed defect. 43
c. Premises Open to the Public
When the lessor knows that the premises are to be open to

the public, the public policy of protecting persons who are not a
party to the lease 144 indicates that the lessor should be responsible for ensuring that the premises are reasonably safe for the
public at the time of the transfer of possession. Consequently, a
lessor must use due care to discover and remedy unreasonably
dangerous conditions if he has reason to expect that the lessee
45
will not remedy such problems prior to admitting the public.

140. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 437;, RESTATEMENT, supra note
10, §§ 379-379A; 49 AM. JuR. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 898-913 (1970).
141. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 437; RESTATEMENT, supra note
10, §§ 379 comment g, 379A comment d.
142. See Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 365, 162 S.E. 329,
333 (1932); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 358;
49 AM. JuR. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 787-792 (1970).
143. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
144. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 438; 49 AM. JuR. 2D Landlord
and Tenant § 783 (1970).
145. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 437:40; 49 AMi.JuR. 2D Landlord
and Tgnant §§ 782-786 (1970).
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Maintenance of the premises subsequent to the transfer, however, is normally the duty of the lessee unless some other exception applies. 14 6
147
Application of this rule involves a number of distinctions.
For example, since the landlord's duty is based on the knowledge that the public will be using a certain area, the landlord is
not responsible for injuries incurred outside that area.1 48 Not all
these distinctions are supported by sound policy. For example, it
may be arbitrary to distinguish between persons such as customers in a store, who are in a public area pursuant to the purposes
of the lease, and other persons who are also lawfully on the
premises, such as the tenant's family members. Neither the patrons nor the family members have a possessory interest in the
real estate. Nevertheless, the general rule appears to be that
such other persons lawfully on the premises are not owed a duty
of due care by the lessor. 14 9 Perhaps in time this type of artificiality will yield to the more reasonable approach adopted in other
areas of premises liability.'"
d.

Common Areas Under Control of Lessor

One reason sometimes given for the lack of the lessor's duty
is that he has surrendered control of the premises to the

146. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 439-40; 49 AM. JuR. 2D Landlord

and Tenant § 786 (1970).
147. In addition to the distinction discussed in the text, the application of this rule
involves numerous other distinctions. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 43740; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 359; 49 Am. JuR. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 782-785

(1970).
148. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 439 n.70;

RESTATEMENT,

supra

note 10, § 359 comment f; 49 AM. Jur. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 784 (1970); Annotation, What Constitutes a "Public" Use Affecting Landlord's Liability to Tenant's Invitees for Defects in Leased Premises, 17 A.L.R.3D 873 (1968).
149. See Hatfield v. Palles, 537 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1976); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 8, § 63, at 439 n.71; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 359 comment e; 49 Am. JUR. 2D
Landlord and Tenant § 784 (1970); Annotation, What Constitutes a "Public" Use Affecting Landlord'sLiability to the Tenant's Invitees for Defects in Leased Premises, 17
A.L.R.3D 873 (1968).
150. See, e.g., Taylor v. Palmetto Theatre Co., 204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538 (1943). In
Taylor a fireman's status was determined by the place in which he was injured - a place
open to business invitees. Consequently, he was treated as an invitee who was owed a

duty of due care rather than as a licensee, the normal status of a fireman at that time.
See infra notes 248-252 and accompanying text for discussion of invitees and licensees in
this context.
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lessee."" Consequently, the lessor, rather than the lessee, has a
duty to use due care to maintain common areas, such as hallways, that remain under the lessor's control.'52
e.

Undertaking

Consistent with the general rule that a person who undertakes to perform an act must use due care, a lessor must use due
care if he attempts to make the premises safe.153 When a land-

lord merely promises to repair but actually does not do anything, the result is less clear. The old common-law approach,
which South Carolina appears to follow,5 imposes only a contractual duty on the landlord.' 55 Liability in such a case could
only be based on "negligence on the part of the lessor in making
repairs, and not a failure to make repairs as promised."' 56 Consequently, personal injuries for breach were not recoverable unless special circumstances enabled the court to conclude that
151. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
152. See Sickora v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 99, 101, 292 S.E.2d 593, 595
(1982) (dictum) (no negligence shown); Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 59 S.E.2d 149,
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 841 (1950); Binnicker v. Adden, 204 S.C. 487, 492, 30 S.E.2d 142,
145 (1944); Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 373-74, 162 S.E. 329,
333-34 (1932); Medlock v. McAlister, 120 S.C. 65, 112 S.E. 436 (1922); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8,§ 63, at 440-43; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 360-361; 49 AM. JUR.
2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 805-827 (1970). The Soith Carolina Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act also imposes a duty to maintain common areas. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 2740-440(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). The possible application of this act to an action
for personal injuries is discussed infra at notes 176-198 and accompanying text.
153. See McQuillen v. Dobbs, 262 S.C. 386, 204 S.E.2d 732 (1974); Conner v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 139-40, 132 S.E.2d 385, 388-89 (1963); Brown v.
National Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 358, 105 S.E.2d 81, 87 (1958); see also Edwards, Inc. v.
Arlen Realty Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 509-10 (D.S.C. 1978); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 8,§ 63, at 445-46; REsTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 362; Note, Personal Injuries to the Tenant: The Landlord's Liability in Tort Therefor, 10 S.C.L. REv. 307 (1958);
49 Am.JuR. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 793-798 (1970). In Roundtree Villas Ass'n v.
4701 Kings Corp., 282 S.C. 415, 423, 321 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1984), a lender was held to owe a
duty of due care to a condominium association when it voluntarily undertook to repair
common areas.
154. See, e.g., Shaw v. Still, 259 S.C. 377, 192 S.E.2d 206 (1972); Sheppard v. Nienow, 254 S.C. 44, 173 S.E.2d 343 (1970); Pendarvis v. Wannamaker, 173 S.C. 299, 175
S.E. 531 (1934); Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329
(1932).
155. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 443; 49 AM.JuR 2D Landlord
and Tenant § 850 (1970).
156. Conner v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 139, 132 S.E.2d 385, 388
(1963).
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such consequential losses were foreseeable because they were
within the contemplation of the parties."5 7
The current rule in most jurisdictions appears to be that in
order to promote safety and protect the right of reasonable reliance on a promise of safety precautions, the promising lessor is
potentially liable in tort as well as contract. 158 A similar result
was reached in one South Carolina case which held that when an
express warranty of habitability had been granted, the lessee
15 9
could recover damages for a fire resulting from faulty wiring.
This case is consistent with the South Carolina rule allowing recovery personal injuries in a breach of contract action if the injuries are a foreseeable consequential loss - for example, if the
tenant's safety was a particular concern of the agreement.6 0
3. Warranty, Strict Liability in Tort, and a Possible
Statutory Duty of Due Care
The limited protection for tenants granted by the system

157. See, e.g., Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Co., 164 S.C. 361, 371-72, 162 S.E.
329, 332-33 (1932). The landlord in Timmons agreed to fix the hinges on a door, but had
not undertaken to do so. The door fell off and struck the plaintiff, who was the infant
child of the tenant. The court concluded that these facts were not sufficient
to show that, when the contract of letting was entered into, and the contemporaneous covenant to repair made, either the landlord, or the tenant, or any
member of the latter's family, then had any notice or knowledge of the unsafe
condition of the demised premises sufficient to warrant a judicial declaration
that damages for personal injuries were reasonably within contemplation of the
parties.
Id, at 372, 162 S.E. at 333.
158. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 443-45; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 10, § 357; 49 AM. Jun. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 851 (1970).
159. See Holmes v. Rosner, 289 S.C. 287, 290, 346 S.E.2d 37, 38 (Ct. App. 1986).
Holmes also held that damages for personal injury are not recoverable for "breach of an
express warranty to maintain the premises in a safe condition." Id. at 289-90, 346 S.E.2d
at 38. The basis for granting a recovery for one warranty but not the other is unclear,
particularly since breach of the warranty of safe condition would seem the more likely
basis for granting recovery for personal injuries. See Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods.
Co., 164 S.C. 361, 374, 162 S.E. 329, 334 (dictum indicated that recovery for personal
injury allowed for breach of covenant to keep premises safe).
160. See, e.g., Young v. Morrisey, 285 S.C. 236, 239, 329 S.E.2d 426, 429 (1935)
("Absent an express warranty or fraudulent concealment,. . . [the landlord] is not liable
for any defect in the leased premises."); Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Co., 164 S.C.
361, 374, 162 S.E. 329, 334 (1932) (a review of cases by the court indicated that an action
for personal injuries is allowed "when the covenant is to keep the premises safe during
the term").
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discussed above contrasts sharply with the extensive protection
granted by South Carolina law to consumers when the sale of
goods or homes is involved.161 Some states have reduced or eliminated this contrast by strengthening tenants' protection by imposing some theory of strict liability.1 6 2 Courts in other states,
including South Carolina, have continued to use the traditional
1 63
common-law approach of caveat lessee.

In Young v. Morrisey164 the plaintiff attempted to persuade
the court to reject this common-law approach and to impose either an implied warranty of habitability or strict liability in tort
on a defendant who was the builder-lessor of an apartment complex. The plaintiff in Young was suing for damages resulting
from the death of two guests in the complex165 who had died in a
fire caused by defective wiring. 6 6 Since the wiring had been installed by an independent contractor, the builder-lessor was not
responsible for the negligence, 67 nor had the defendant been
negligent in supervising construction or in maintaining the
premises. 16 The South Carolina Supreme Court refused to hold
the landlord strictly liable in tort. 69 The court also held that
leases did not involve an implied warranty of habitability such
as that imposed in the sale of a residence. 7 °
The refusal to extend protection to lessees similar to that
extended to purchasers of products was defended on grounds of
public policy. The court noted that there were "numerous compelling reasons for refusing to impose strict liability on
landlords."''

161. See supra notes 71-73, 88-89, 94 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116

(1985).
163. See, e.g., Borders v. Roseberry, 216 Kan. 486, 488-89, 532 P.2d 1366, 1369
(1975) (landlord of single family house under no duty to repair known condition; general

rule of "no duty" modified by series of exceptions). For comprehensive treatments, see
Browder, The Taming of a Duty - The Tort Liability of Landlords,81 MicH. L. REv. 99

(1982); Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or
Strict Liability, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19 (1975).

164. 285 S.C. 236, 329 S.E.2d 426 (1985).
165. See id. at 239, 329 S.E.2d at 428.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

242, 329 S.E.2d at
242-43, 329 S.E.2d
239-41, 329 S.E.2d
241, 329 S.E.2d at
240, 329 S.E.2d at
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(1) A landlord is not engaged in mass production whereby he
places his product

-

the apartment

-

in a stream of com-

merce exposing it to a large number of consumers; (2) he has
not created the product with a defect which is preventable by
greater care at the time of manufacture or assembly; (3) he
does not have the expertise to know and correct the condition,
so as to be saddled with responsibility for a defect regardless of
negligence; (4) an apartment includes several rooms with many
facilities constructed by many artisans with differing types of
expertise, and subject to constant use and deterioration from
many causes; (5) it is a commodity wholly unlike a product
which is expected to leave a manufacturer's hands in a safe
condition with an implied representation upon which the consumer relies; (6) the tenant may expect that at the time of letting there are no hidden dangerous defects known to the landlord of which the tenant has not been warned, but he does not
expect that all will be perfect in his apartment for all the years
of his occupancy; (7) to apply strict liability would impose an
unjust burden on property owners; how can a property owner
prevent a latent defect or repair when he has no way of detecting it? And if he can't prevent the defect, why should he be
liable? . . .
This Court has rejected the insurer concept in numerous
similar settings. .

.

. Nor do we hold landlords insurers of the

safety of2 tenants and guests from injuries caused by latent
17

defects.

A full analysis of this reasoning is beyond the scope of this article. One should note, however, that these reasons raise many
questions because they do not seem entirely appropriate to the
facts. For example:
(1) The landlord in Young built, owned, and operated a
large apartment complex. As a result, he had as much expertise
and ability to prevent defects as a product manufacturer, and
like a manufacturer, he placed his "product" in the stream of
commerce where it affected many persons.
(2) Tenants do not expect "perfect" apartments, but one
reasonably may assume that they do not expect them to burn

suddenly.

172, Id. at 240-41, 329 S.E.2d at 428-29 (quoting from Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments,

Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (Ct. App. Div.), af'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1
(1973)).
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(3) Chattels, like apartments, are subject to constant use
and deterioration from many causes.
(4) Being liable for unreasonably dangerous product defects
is not the same thing as being an insurer.
The reasons for refusing to imply a warranty also raise
questions. The court gave several justifications for treating the
lease of an apartment differently from the sale of a home: "The
instant case involves [1] a lease rather than a sale, [2] personal
injuries to a guest rather than property loss to the purchaser,
and [3] an apartment used by many lessors [sic] rather than a
new house.' 17s These reasons, however, do not support a distinction between leasing and buying. The first and third "reasons"
are simply restatements of the fact that a lease rather than a
sale is involved. The second reason is particularly questionable
on
since courts and legislatures usually place greater emphasis
74
liability for personal injury than for economic injury.1
Young did not consider the validity of the distinctions between leases of products and leases of realty. Such a consideration may be necessary in the future because the South Carolina
Court of Appeals has held that a lessor bf a chattel impliedly
warrants that the chattel is reasonably fit for the purposes for
which it will be used.17 5
Young's rejection of strict liability and of the warranty of
habitability may have been reversed by the legislature by the
adoption of the South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. 7 61 The basic thrust of the Act is to treat a lease like any
other contract and to impose a number of new obligations on
landlords,'" including duties to comply with safety codes, 7 8 to
"do whatever is reasonably necessary to put up and keep the
premises in a fit and habitable condition,"' 79 and to maintain

173. Id. at 241, 329 S.E.2d at 429.
174. See, e.g., supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text (liability in negligence for
"pure economic" loss); see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(strict liability in tort for personal injury from defective product); id. § 36-2-719(3) (special treatment under U.C.C. for personal injury resulting from breach of warranty).
175. See C. Ray Miles Const. Co. v. Weaver, 296 S.C. 466, 373 S.E.2d 905 (Ct. App.

1988). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
176. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
177. See id.; Wilcox, A Lawyer's Guide to the South CarolinaResidential Landlord
and Tenant Act, 39 S.C.L. REv. 493 (1988).
178. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-440(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
179. Id. § 27-40-440(a)(2).
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certain facilities and appliances "in reasonably good and safe
working order and condition."'1 80 The Act does not explicitly
provide for recovery of damages for personal injury or property
damage when landlords breach these warranties. Nevertheless,
such damages may be recoverable under either a contract theory
or a tort theory.
One could argue that the Act imposes contractual duties
and provides recovery for both economic and personal injuries.
The provisions of the Act support such an argument. The Act
provides that "the tenant may recover actual damages

. . .

for

any noncompliance by the landlord with the rental agreement"
or his statutory duties.' 81 The Act also provides that the "remedies provided by this chapter must be so administered that an
aggrieved party may recover appropriate damages."' 82 Finally,
the Act provides that it "must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies,"''

83

which

include encouraging "landlords and tenants to maintain and improve the quality of housing."' 84
These provisions could have important consequences on the
application of the common-law rule that consequential losses,
like personal injuries, are not recoverable for a landlord's contractual breach unless the breach was within the contemplation
of the parties. 18 5 Two South Carolina cases indicate that because
of the statutory duties imposed by the Act, this common-law
rule might now permit recovery for personal injuries. One case
explicitly held that a tenant could recover for personal injuries
caused by a landlord's breach of an express warranty of habitability;'86 the other case indicates that damages for personal injuries are recoverable either for breach of a statutory duty or for a
breach of a covenant to keep the premises safe.187 Thus, a good
argument may be made that tenants could recover for personal
injury under the Act.

180. Id. § 27-40-440(a)(5).

181. Id. § 27-40-610(b).
182. Id. § 27-40-50.
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-20(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
184. Id. § 27-40-20(b)(2).

185. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
186. See Holmes v. Rosner, 289 S.C. 287, 290, 346 S.E.2d 37, 38 (Ct. App. 1986).

187. See Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 374, 162 S.E. 329,
333 (1932).
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There is less reason, however, to believe that the tenant's
guests or other third parties probably would be "aggrieved parties" entitled to recover. The literal wording of the Act refers to
the tenant's right to recover damages.""' If this language were
applied strictly, lack of privity would prevent third parties from
recovering under a contractual theory based on the statutory
warranties. On the other hand, the statutory requirement of liberal construction, 89 coupled with judicial reluctance to rely
upon lack of privity to bar actions for breach of the warranty of
habitability in the sale of homes, 90° may provide sufficient reason to extend the Act's protection to third parties.
An alternative theory for recovery is to view the statute as
the basis of implying a tort duty of due care, breach of which
could be the basis of an action for negligence. 9 ' If such an action were recognized, it would be available to all foreseeable victims. 192 A tort damages claim, however, may not reach "pure economic loss.' 193 Even so, this limit should not be a problem in

most cases4 since the tenant has protection for such loss under
9
the Act.

Since the Act does not provide explicitly for a tort cause of
action, one must consider the legislative intent. The best guide

188. See id. § 27-40-610(b). A "tenant" is defined as "a person entitled under a
rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others." Id. § 27-40210(15).
189. See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 97, 110 and accompanying text. Cf. Timmons v. Williams
Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932). Timmons indicates in dictum that
"recovery for personal injuries to the tenant, or to a member of his family," are allowed
for breach of a statutory duty or for breach of an express covenant to keep the premises
safe. Id. at 374, 162 S.E. at 333-34 (emphasis added).
191. See Timmons, 164 S.C. at 374, 162 S.E. at 333. Timmons indicated in dictum
that "recovery for personal injuries to the tenant, or to a member of his family, are
bottomed [inter alia] upon breach of a statutory duty." Timmons, however, does not
indicate whether this is a tort or contract theory of recovery. The Ohio Supreme Court
held that breach of a duty imposed by a statute similar to the South Carolina Landlord
and Tenant Act was neligence per se. See Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio St. 2d
20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981). One commentator has argued that a similar approach could
be adopted in South Carolina. See Wilcox, A Lawyer's Guide to the South Carolina
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 39 S.C.L. REV. 493, 531-32 (1988).
192. See Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 399, 271 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1980) (in action
for negligent construction, the "key inquiry is foreseeability, not privity").
193. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text for discussion of recoverability of
pure economic loss in an action for negligence.
194. See supra notes 181-187 and accompanying text.
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to legislative intent in this regard is the language of the statute.195 This language, however, does not explicitly state whether
tenants may press a tort claim, so it is necessary to infer the
intent.
When one attempts to infer the legislative intent, two contradictory inferred "intents" are equally plausible. First, the legislature could not reasonably impose new statutory duties on
landlords without granting a meaningful system of enforcement
and remedies. Therefore, one logically may presume that the
legislature intended to protect foreseeable victims by providing
tort remedies. This inference is logical because tort liability provides an incentive for landlords to keep the premises reasonably
safe and furthers the statutory goal of maintaining the quality of
rental housing. Conversely, if the legislature had wanted a tort
remedy in addition to the contract action, it could explicitly
have included one. Since it did not and because it explicitly provided for contractual remedies, one may infer that no tort action
exists. Thus, whether an implied tort cause of action exists for
breach of the statutory duties is not clear. The builder of a
leased residence is subject to an implied warranty of workman197
ship.19 s As indicated in the earlier discussion of this warranty,
however, it is not certain whether other persons, such as tenants
or their guests, who are not in privity with the builder, have a
cause of action for breach of the warranty. Even if privity is required, a tenant might satisfy the requirement if the builder is
also his landlord. 9
4. Foreseeable Misconduct by Third Parties
At one time, even if an exception to the doctrine of caveat
lessee might have been applicable, courts generally were reluctant to impose on lessors a duty to protect lessees (or others,
such as invitees) from foreseeable misconduct by third parties -

195. See G-H Ins. Agency Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 270 S.C. 147, 241 S.E.2d 534
(1978) (duty of good faith); Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E. 351 (Ct.
App. 1985) (to determine liability under statute, court looked only to language of statute,
not to intent behind its enactment). The South Carolina Legislature does not publish a
legislative history.
196. See supra notes 91, 108-109 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 108-115 and accompanying text.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss3/2

40

Hubbard and Felix: Liabilities of Sellers and Lessors of Residential Realty in South

1989]

RESIDENTIAL REALTY

for example, assault or rape.' The current view in some jurisdictions is that although the landlord has no general duty to
protect tenants from such misconduct, 0 0 if an exception applies,
such as the duty to use due care to protect tenants in a common
area like an entry hall,2 01 then the duty of due care encompasses
such foreseeable misconduct.2 02 There are two reasons why
South Carolina may adopt this approach. First, South Carolina
courts have held that invitees are entitled to reasonable protection from the foreseeable misconduct of others.20 3 Second, the
general rule is that tenants and others rightfully using common
areas are analogous to invitees. °4
B.

The Variable Standards of Care Owed to Third Parties
by Lessors and Tenants

Regardless of whether the lessee or lessor has the duty of
maintaining safe premises, one should remember that the duty

199. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63, at 442.
200. See Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1981) (landlord
has no duty to protect tenants when violent acts had not occurred before on the premises
and when he was not aware of any risks attendant to the premises that were concealed
from tenant).
201. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(landlord has duty to protect tenants in the common areas). The landlord's obligation
concerning common areas is discussed supra, at notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
202. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 63; 49 AM. JuR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 773.5 (2d ed. Supp. 1988); Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant
Against CriminalActivities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3D 331 (1972). Some jurisdictions
appear to have extended this duty to protest against forceable misconduct to include a
duty to make the lessee's individual apartment unit safe from burglars and rapists, particularly where the lessor has special knowledge of a threat of crime and/or of the inadequacy of the locks. See Smith v. General Apartment Co., 133 Ga. App. 927, 213 S.E.2d 74
(1975), overruled on other grounds, Country Club Apartments, Inc. v. Scott, 246 Ga. 442,
271 S.E.2d 841 (1980); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76
(1975). In addition to the exceptions applicable to the landlord tenant context, the landlord also may owe a duty of due care for other reasons: (1) first, because a special relationship exists, see supra note 130 and accompanying text; (2) second, because the lessor
has undertaken to fix or improve the safety of the leased premises, see, e.g., Warner v.
Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974); see also supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text; (3) third, because the lessor has misrepresented the adequacy of the
security system or the safety of the area. See O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75
Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977) (landlord liable to raped tenant when tenant
was misled about security measures and had not been warned of man who had raped
other tenants); see also supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 253-258 and accompanying text.
204. See PROSSER & KEEToN, supra note 8, § 63, at 440 n.771.
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varies with the circumstances. Two circumstances are particularly important. First, one must consider whether the victim is
on or off the premises. Second, if the victim is on the premises,

his status determines the nature of the duty. The variable duties
for varying circumstances will be addressed in this section.
Another important fact to keep in mind is that lessors and
tenants are not liable unless they breach the relevant duty. For
example, if a duty of due care is involved, that duty only requires that the safety precautions be "reasonable." Thus, if a
risk is unforeseeable or if the safety precautions were reasonably
adequate, there is no breach of the duty of due care and, therefore, no liability.
1. Background: The Common-Law System of Categories
At common law owners and occupiers did not owe a duty of
due care to every person on or adjacent to their land. The duty
varied, particularly according to the status or category of the
person entering the land. For example, since trespassers are
wrongdoers and their presence may have been unknown, the
owner or occupier only owed a duty to refrain from wanton or
willful misconduct. 0 5 As to other persons on the land, such as
social guests, the owner or occupier owed a higher duty than
that owed to trespassers; this standard, however, still was less
than due care. 20 6 For example, a host had a duty to disclose hid-

den dangers to his social guests, but did not have to use due care
to discover the risks.20 7 This lesser standard of care was defended on the grounds that the host received no economic benefit from the social visit; therefore, the social guest was entitled to
no greater safety than that enjoyed by the host and his family. 08
Because of such reasons, as well as stare decisis, South Carolina utilizes the traditional common-law system of variable care
owed according to different categories of persons on the land.209
Consequently, this section will discuss the definition of each category or status and the standard of care owed to each.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See
See
Id.
See
See

infra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
infra notes 230-242 and accompanying text.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 60.
Neil v. Byrum, 288 S.C. 472, 343 S.E.2d 615 (1986).
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One should note that the traditional common-law scheme
has been criticized on a number of grounds. 10 For instance, the
scheme arguably gives inadequate weight to the importance of
accident prevention and spreading accident costs through the
widespread practice of homeowners' and tenants' insurance.
These criticisms have led some jurisdictions to modify or abandon the status system.211 On the other hand, a number of jurisdictions recently have refused to abandon or modify the system,212 and the Restatement still uses the traditional commonlaw approach.21 3
Generally, an owner or occupier is the person having control
of the premises.2 14 Thus, people who control the premises are
subject to liability consistent with the class of people on the
premises. 215 Regardless of the category and the standard of care
involved, however, the owner or occupier cannot be held liable if
he, in fact, does not control the dangerous condition or have the
capability to make it safer. For example, an owner or occupier is
not liable for injury from a dangerous condition in a road 2 16 or

stream 217 across his property if he does not have the authority to
control its condition.
2. Persons Off the Premises
An owner or occupier must use due care to ensure that persons outside his premises are not injured by activities on the
premises or by "artificial conditions" or structures that he constructs or knows to exist on his land.21 8 Indeed, under some cir210. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
211. See Rowland, id.; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 62; Hawkins, Premises
Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation of Judge and Jury
Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 15 (1981); 62 Am. Jurm 2D Premises Liability §§ 59-60
(1972).
212. See PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 8, § 62 n.7.
213. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 328E-370 (categorizing liability
based upon status of persons on land).
214. See id. § 328E; 62 AM. JurL 2D Premises Liability §§ 12-23 (1972). In addition
to the owner-occupier, household members and the owner-occupier's agents are subject
to the same system of duties. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 382-384.
215. See King v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 278 S.C. 350, 296 S.E.2d 335 (1982) (independent contractor liable to employees of owner coming onto premises).
216. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 211 S.C. 209, 44 S.E.2d 314 (1947).
217. See, e.g., Byrd v. Melton, 259 S.C. 271, 191 S.E.2d 515 (1972).
218. See Humphries v. Union & Glenn Springs R.R., 84 S.C. 202, 65 S.E. 202 (1909);
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cumstances, an owner or occupier may be held strictly liable to
those outside the premises.2 1 In addition, an owner or occupier
is liable for the conduct of third parties in some situations. For
example, he will be liable if he allows third persons to enter the
premises and cause injury or if his employees create a dangerous
condition.2 20
On the other hand, where natural conditions were involved
such as a tree or an embankment - there was no commonlaw duty of due care unless the owner or occupier created or
altered the natural condition. 221 The result was that a tree might
have fallen on a neighbor's house without liability so long as
nothing had been done to alter its natural growth. This rule has
been criticized as inappropriate to modern urban conditions because it provides no incentive to prevent such injury.22 2 As a re22 3
sult of such criticisms, many states, including South Carolina,
have rejected the common-law rule and imposed a duty of due
care for the protection of persons off the premises regardless of

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 57; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 364-371; 62 AM.
Jun. 2D Premises Liability §§ 5-11. At times the application of this rule appears questionable. For example, the result in Cromer v. Hutto, 276 S.C. 499, 280 S.E.2d 202
(1981), seems contrary to this rule since the court appears to have held that the operator
of a parking lot had no duty to protect persons off-premises from the foreseeable risk of
a person's losing control of his automobile and, thus, injuring pedestrians walking by the
lot, In Mahle v. Wilson, 283 S.C. 486, 323 S.E.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1984), the court of appeals
held that an owner did not have an affirmative duty to adopt safety measures to protect
persons on the public highway adjacent to its property. While this statement of the law
is unobjectionable, the case does not address the issue of the possible existence and
scope of the duty to insure safe access to an invitee. See infra notes 253-258 and accompanying text.
219. See Wallace v. A.H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960) (holding
liable a ditch excavater engaging in dynamite blasting even though arguably not negligent); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, §§ 76, 78, 90, 91; 62 AM. JuPL 2D Premises Liability §§ 8-9 (1972).
220. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 57. For an extreme example of an
owner's liability for the acts of a rapist who used the abandoned building as a place to
commit the rape, see Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.
1985).
221. See PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 8, § 57; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 363
(nonurban settings).
222, See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 57, at 391; RESTATEMENT, supra note
10, § 363(2) (urban settings).
223. See, e.g., Israel v. Carolina Bar-B-Que, Inc., 292 S.C. 282, 288, 356 S.E.2d 123,
127 (Ct. App.) (urban conditions require due care) (case surveyed in Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 40 S.C.L. REv. 242 (1988)), cert. denied, 293 S.C. 406, 360
S.E.2d 824 (1987).
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whether natural or artificial conditions are involved.224
3. Persons on the Premises
There are four categories of persons who come on premises
- adult trespassers, licensees, invitees, and children - and the
standard of care varies for each.
a. Adult Trespassers
An adult who trespasses, that is, who comes on the premises
without permission or without a legal privilege,22 5 is a wrongdoer
and likely is unexpected. Therefore, he is owed a very limited
duty. The owner or occupier need not use due care, but merely
must refrain from inflicting injury either by intent or by willful
or wanton conduct.226 Some jurisdictions vary this rule and impose a duty of due care as to adult trespassers whose presence is
foreseeable and/or acquiesced in - trespassers who continually
use a particular, limited area 227 or trespassers who are known to
be present.228 South Carolina has reached a similar result by
holding that acquiescence in a pattern of trespassing can be
viewed as an implicit grant of permission so that the person
coming on the premises is a licensee.2 29

224. See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783, 636
P.2d 1121 (1981).
225. See Smiley v. Southern Ry., 184 S.C. 130, 191 S.E. 895 (1936); Kershaw Motor
Co. v. Southern Ry., 136 S.C. 377, 134 S.E. 377 (1926); see also Silas v. Bowen, 277 F.
Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1967); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 393; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 10, § 329; 67 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability §§ 55-57 (1972). Whether a person is a
trespasser is a jury issue if the facts permit more than one reasonable influence. See
Duke v. Westvaco Dev. Corp., 279 S.C. 464, 466, 309 S.E.2d 293, 294 (Ct. App. 1983).
226. See Nettles v. Your Ice Co., 191 S.C. 429, 4 S.E.2d 797 (1939); Kershaw Motor
Co. v. Southern Ry., 136 S.C. 377, 134 S.E. 377 (1926); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8,

§ 58; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 333; 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability §§ 87-96
(1972).
227. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 58, at 396-99; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 10, §§ 334-335; 62 AM. JuR 2D Premises Liability § 94 (1972).
228. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 58, at 396-99; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 10, §§ 336-338; 62 AM. JuL 2D Premises Liability §§ 93, 95 (1972).
229. See Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Air Line Ry., 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 476 (1951);
Smiley v. Southern Ry., 184 S.C. 130, 191 S.E. 895 (1936).
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b. Licensees
A licensee has either the owner's or occupier's consent230 or
some other privilege 23 1 to visit the premises, but he is there for32
his own purpose rather than to benefit the owner or occupier.
Examples of licensees include social guests 233 and persons given
implied consent to cross the land for their own benefit.2 34 Under

South Carolina statute, however, a person who is given permission to use land for recreational purposes is not a licensee and
cannot recover unless gross negligence, willfulness, or malice is
involved.235
A licensee has permission to enter the premises and is not a
wrongdoer; therefore, he is owed a higher duty than a trespasser.
On the other hand, since licensees are on the premises for their
own benefit, they can be said to accept the premises as they are
and may demand no greater safety than their host provides himself.2 6 A licensee, thus, is owed something less than a duty of

due care. The duty owed to a licensee was summarized in Neil v.
Byrum2 37 as follows:

230. See Neil v. Byrum, 288 S.C. 472, 343 S.E.2d 615 (1986).
231. For further discussion of persons rightfully on land because of a privilege, see
infra notes 271-273; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 345; 62 AM. JuR. 2D PremisesLiability §§ 38, 102 (1972).
232. See Smiley v. Southern Ry., 184 S.C. 130, 191 S.E. 895 (1937); Hill v. Broad
River Power Co., 151 S.C. 280, 148 S.E. 870 (1929); Mathers v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.
Co., 67 S.C. 499, 46 S.E. 335 (1903); see also Frankel v. Kurtz, 239 F. Supp. 713 (D.S.C.
1965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 60, at 414-15; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10,
§ 330; 62 AM. JuR. 2D Premises Liability §§ 51-54 (1972).
233. See Neil v. Byrum, 288 S.C. 472, 343 S.E.2d 615 (1986); see also Frankel v.
Kurtz, 239 F. Supp. 713 (D.S.C. 1965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 60.
234. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 60, at 413-14.
235. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-40, -60 (Law. Co-op. 1976); see also id. §§ 27-3-10
to -70.
236. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 60, at 412-14. Both Smiley v. Southern
Ry., 184 S.C. 130, 191 S.E. 895 (1937), and Matthews v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 67 S.C.
499, 46 S.E. 335 (1903), stress this acceptance of the risk of the premises since they
require that the licensee know of the risk or that "the owner may properly assume that
they enter the premises in full contemplation of the danger, and of their own volition
assume the risk." See Matthews, 67 S.C. at 512, 46 S.E. at 339 (emphasis added). Since
this rule is phrased in terms of what the owner-occupier reasonably may foresee about
the licensee (and not in terms of what the licensee knew in fact), the issue clearly involves duty rather than the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, which is phrased in
terms of whether the victim actually knew of the risk involved. See, e.g., Easler v. Hejaz
Temple, 285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (1985).
237. 288 S.C. 472, 343 S.E.2d 615 (1986).
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A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter upon land by
virtue of the possessor's consent. The possessor is under no obligation to exercise care to make the premises safe for his reception, and is under no duty toward him except:
(a) To use reasonable care to discover him and avoid injury to him in carrying on activities upon the land.
(b) To use reasonable care to warn him of any concealed
dangerous conditions or activities which are known to the possessor, or of any change in the condition of the premises which
may be dangerous to
him, and which he may reasonably be ex38
pected to discover.1
As this summary indicates, distinguishing between activities
and conditions on the premises is important. Activities must be
conducted with a reasonable amount of care for the safety of
licensees. 23 9 The owner or occupier, however, need not change
the activities conducted on his premises if risks are obvious to
the licensee or if the licensee has been warned.240 When conditions are involved, the owner or occupier need not use due care
to make the premises safe by discovering and correcting unreasonable risks. He only is required to use due care to discover
licensees and to warn them of unreasonable risks resulting from
those conditions 241 that the owner knows about but that are unknown and not reasonably discoverable by the licensee.24 2
c.

Invitees

An invitee is a person who comes on the premises of another
with express or implied permission and for the purpose of bene-

238. Id. at 473, 343 S.E.2d at 616 (quoting Frankel v. Kurtz, 239 F. Supp. 713, 717

(D.S.C. 1965)) (emphasis in original deleted).
239. See Smiley v. Southern Ry., 184 S.C. 130, 191 S.E. 895 (1937); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 60.

240. See Smiley, 184 S.C. 130, 191 S.E. 895; Matthews, 67 S.C. 499, 46 S.E. 335;
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 60, at 416-47; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 341341A. See supra note 236 for discussion indicating why duty, rather than assumption of
risk, is involved.

241. See Frankel v. Kurtz, 269 F. Supp. 713, 720-21 (D.S.C. 1965) (risk must be
considered in terms of the known infirmities of a particular victim).

242. See, e.g., Smiley, 184 S.C. 130, 191 S.E. 895; Hill v. Broad River Power Co., 151
S.C. 280, 148 S.E. 870 (1929); Matthews, 67 S.C. 499, 46 S.E. 335; see also Frankel v.
Kurtz, 269 F. Supp. 713 (D.S.C. 1965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 60, at 417-18.
See supra note 236 for discussion indicating why duty, rather than assumption of risk, is
involved.
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fitting the owner or occupier.2 4 1 Invitees include store patrons, 244
patients in physicians' offices, 245 persons visiting gas stations to
use the restrooms or vending machines,2 46 and workers invited to
work on the premises. 247 Public employees, such as water-meter
readers, generally are regarded as invitees. 24s Nevertheless, in
many jurisdictions firemen and policemen are considered mere
licensees because their presence often is sudden and unexpected.248 South Carolina appears to follow this approach.25 0
This view, however, has been criticized, 251 and252other jurisdictions regard firemen and policemen as invitees.
An owner or occupier owes an invitee a duty of due care to
discover risks and to take safety precautions to warn of or eliminate unreasonable risks,25 3 including the foreseeable risk of criminal conduct by others 254 within the area of invitation 255 on the
premises. 25 6 The duty is only that of due care; if there is no negligence, there is no liability. Thus, for example, recovery may be
denied if a reasonable person would not have been aware of the

243. See Parker v. Stevenson Oil Co., 245 S.C. 275, 140 S.E.2d 177 (1965).
244. See Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167
(1977).
245. See Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P.A., 269 S.C. 389, 237 S.E.2d 753 (1977).
246. See Parker, 245 S.C. 275, 140 S.E.2d 177.
247. See Wilson v. Duke Power Co., 273 S.C. 610, 258 S.E.2d 101 (1979); see also
Honea v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 380 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1967).
248. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 61; 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability
§ 102 (1972).
249. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 61, at 429-32; 62 AM. Jua. 2D Premises
Liability §§ 103-105 (1972). When it does not matter that the presence is unexpected for example, if the area is open to the public - then this rule should not apply. See
Taylor v. Palmetto Theatre Co., 204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538 (1943) (fireman in public area
treated as invitee).
250. Cf. Taylor, 204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538. The fireman in Taylor was in an area
allegedly open to the public, and thus, he was able to claim the status of an invitee.
251. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 61.
252. See id., supra note 8, § 61, 432 nn. 52-53. This result was reached in Taylor,
204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538, because the injury occurred in a place open to the public, and
the fireman, therefore, could be regarded as an invitee.
253. See Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167
(1977); Bruno v. Pendleton Realty Co., 240 S.C. 46, 124 S.E.2d 580 (1962); Mullinax v.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 221 S.C. 433, 70 S.E.2d 911 (1952); PROSSER & K(YTON, supra

note 8, § 61, at 425-28.
254. See Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167
(1977); Daniel v. Day's Inn of Am., Inc., 292 S.C. 291, 356 S.E.2d 129 (Ct. App. 1987).
255. See Parker v. Stevenson Oil Co., 245 S.C. 275, 140 S.E.2d 177 (1965); PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 8, § 61, at 424-25.
256. See Mahle v. Wilson, 283 S.C. 486, 323 S.E.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1984).
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risk257 or if the risk was reasonable.25 s
d. Children
Special rules apply to children because they often lack the
capacity to appreciate danger and to understand the culpable
nature of wrongful entry on another's premises.259 When the
premises contain a condition unreasonably dangerous to children, the owner or occupier owes a child the duty of due care '
even if he is a trespasser2" 1 or a licensee.262 While many cases
refer to the condition as an "attractive nuisance," 23 this term
can be misleading under current law since the condition need
not be a nuisance in the normal usage of the term264 and it need
not have attracted the child. 26 5' The crucial issue is whether the
condition is unusually or unreasonably dangerous to children.2 6
257. See Bullard v. Ehrhardt, 283 S.C. 557, 324 S.E.2d 61 (1984); Munn v. Hardee's
Food Sys., Inc., 274 S.C. 529, 266 S.E.2d 414 (1980); Milligan v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.,
273 S.C. 118, 254 S.E.2d 798 (1979); Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C.
479, 238 S.E.2d 167 (1977); Wimberly v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 117, 165
S.E.2d 627 (1969).
258. See Humphries v. McCrory-McLellan Stores Corp., 358 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.
1966).
259. See generally Note, Trespassing Children in South Carolina, 17 S.C.L. REV.
376 (1975) (general discussion of a landowner's duty to trespassing children). The special
nature of the care owed children in negligence actions was discussed explicitly in Mahaffey v. Ahl, 264 S.C. 241, 250, 214 S.E.2d 119, 123 (1975).
260. The duty, therefore, is limited to reasonable precautions. If such precautions
are taken, no liability exists. See McLendon v. Hampton Cotton Mills Co., 109 S.C. 238,
95 S.E. 781 (1917).
261. See Lynch v. Motel Enters., 248 S.C. 490, 151 S.E.2d 435 (1966).
262. Id.; Sexton v. Noll Constr. Co., 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).
263. See Kirven v. Askins, 253 S.C. 110, 169 S.E.2d 139 (1969).
264. See Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S.C. 539, 550-51, 59 S.E.2d 149, 155, cert. denied,
340 U.S. 841 (1950).
265. See Kirven v. Askins, 253 S.C. 110, 169 S.E.2d 139 (1969); Lynch v. Motel Enters., 248 S.C. 490, 151 S.E.2d 435 (1966); Everett v. White, 245 S.C. 331, 140 S.E.2d 582
(1965).
266. See Kirven v. Askins, 253 S.C. 110, 169 S.E.2d 139 (1969) (a clod of dirt on
construction site is not unreasonably dangerous). Kirven suggests that there are two distinct tests --"unreasonably dangerous" and "attractive nuisance". Nevertheless, since an
attractive nuisance must be unreasonably dangerous and since an unreasonably dangerous condition need not attract the child, the net result is that the crucial issue in all
cases is whether there is unreasonable danger.
Other cases suggest that an important consideration is whether the condition is natural or artificial. For example, in Byrd v. Melton, 259 S.C. 271, 191 S.E.2d 515 (1972),
the court denied recovery for injury resulting from drowning in a natural stream, noting
that the owner had no duty to protect from such natural conditions. The court, however,
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In applying this rule, a definition of "child" is necessary. As
a general rule, a person under fourteen probably would be regarded as a child in South Carolina while those who are older

would be considered adults.267 If a child under fourteen, in fact,
was aware of and did appreciate the risk, then he probably could
not recover because he was not a child trespasser unaware of the
situation 16 or because the doctrine of assumption of risk would
apply.
CONCLUSION

As indicated in the Introduction, this article is designed primarily to present and contrast the doctrines applicable to the
sale or lease of residences. Given the nature of common-law development, areas of uncertainty and conflict typically arise
within any doctrinal topic. As a result, this article has had to go
beyond doctrinal presentation in two types of situations. First,
when the doctrinal discussion involved areas in which the rules
and possible developments are unclear - for example, the role
of the warranty of workmanship 269 and the impact of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 270 - several possible approaches were discussed. Second, in areas when the doctrines
appear to be in conflict or appear to be based on questionable
grounds - for example, the difference in treatment between the

also stressed that the risk "was one which the landowners could not feasibly guard
against," because fences, pipes, or coverings would be an unreasonable expense and the
city also had control of the stream. Id. at 276-77, 191 S.E.2 at 517; see also supra note
239-242 and accompanying text. Thus, whether the condition is natural or artificial is
relevant to the reasonableness of the risk; a special duty still should be owed to children
even when natural conditions are involved. Everett v. White, 245 S.C. 331, 140 S.E.2d
582 (1965), also suggests that a condition must be either artificial or an exposed, obvious
risk. Once again, however, these factors appear to be relevant to the reasonableness of
the risk rather than a rule or restriction on the duty of care. This focus on the special
need to protect children from unreasonable risk is consistent with the general policy of
the state. See Mahaffey v. Ahl, 264 S.C. 241, 250, 214 S.E.2d 119, 123 (1975).
267. See McCormick v. Campbell ex rel. Campbell, 285 S.C. 272, 329 S.E.2d 752
(1985); Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 8, § 32, at 181-82; RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 283A comment c.
268. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 59, at 408-10.
269. See id. § 63, at 442.
270. See Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1981) (landlord
has no duty to protect tenants when violent acts had not occurred before on the premises
and when he was not aware of any risks attendant to the premises that were concealed
from tenant).
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liabilities of a builder-seller and a builder-lessee7 1 - the discussion briefly indicated the precise nature of the problems involved. Such areas of uncertainty and conflict are not cause for
concern because they are typical of common-law development.
Indeed, resolution of these problems is the primary way that the
law evolves and reflects changes in our views about rules of liability that should be used in particular circumstances.

271. See supra notes 164-175 and accompanying text.
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